There appears to be little disagreement that the fierce partisan debate over Iraq in the run-up to the midterm congressional elections last week may have largely determined its outcome. During the campaign each party tried to create the perception of certainty as to how to proceed in Iraq without providing any credible evidence or sustainable plan. The sad reality is that the United States lost its ability to direct the course of events in Iraq a long time ago. A reactive policy of shaping decisions in response to events on the ground has long prevailed. Irrational and unpredictable dynamics are dominating and determining the future of Iraq, leaving very few, if any, viable options for the US to pursue. The task of formulating these options has been given to the bipartisan Iraq Study Group led by the onetime Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton. Although some of the group’s findings were alluded to during the campaign, the disclosure of the final report was deliberately scheduled for after the election in order to avoid political interference. The group’s recommendations and conclusions will attempt to provide the Bush administration and the new Congress with a clearer set of options on Iraq, and perhaps the diplomatic and bipartisan face-saving exit strategy which very few have publicly endorsed but privately supported. The months building up to the election produced a wave of rhetoric and literature on how one party’s triumph would signal a dramatic shift in US foreign policy. This was largely designed for partisan consumption, to rouse the party faithful, score points on the airwaves and convince undecided swing voters. For many outside the US, the congressional elections amounted to nothing more than a spectacle that provided a sense of vindication through the defeat of President George W. Bush. Europeans hope this will further increase the perceived moderating and cooperative tendencies of the Bush administration since the beginning of the second term. China may have less to fear from a Democrat-led Congress after the withdrawal of threatening legislation in the Senate and the appointment of Treasury Secretary Paul Hankson, whose expertise on China will largely dominate policy. Approval of Bush’s nuclear deal with India remains uncertain. More unlikely is the extension of the president’s Trade Promotion Authority, curtailing his ability to pursue free trade deals, with significant implications for developing countries, particularly in Latin America. However, Peru’s free-trade agreement with the US may win approval before the end of the outgoing Congress. Furthermore, it would be difficult for the new Congress to oppose a similar deal with Colombia, the third largest recipient of US aid. As Republicans and Democrats eye the Hispanic vote in 2008, the increasing possibility of an immigration reform bill would satisfy Mexico’s newly elected president and provide the opportunity for a new beginning in the bilateral relationship. Apart from the debate over Iraq and its potential for spillover, the campaign arguments had very little resonance, particularly in the Middle East, the target of US efforts for democratization and nation-building. Simply put, the election’s outcome will change little for those in the region. The Iraq debate revolved around tactical shifts resulting from failed policies which most legislators on both sides of the aisle originally supported. The recent Lebanon conflict and the overwhelming bipartisan reaction further crystallized the lack of a congressional foreign policy debate on the Middle East. Instead of weighing the merits of Israeli actions and how it would impact the long-term strategic interests of Israel, Lebanon’s fragile democracy, broader regional stability and ultimately US national interests, the congressional debate degenerated into a contest for who could provide the most unqualified support for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s policies. Legislators who begged to differ on the floors of the Senate and House were attacked for veering from the mainstream bipartisan congressional orthodoxy. This disconnect was further demonstrated at the Executive level during the first international meeting in Rome to address the Lebanon conflict. All participating states called for an immediate cease-fire, except the US (which remained diplomatically isolated) and the United Kingdom. British Prime Minister Tony Blair found himself isolated, accelerating both Labor Party and public pressure for his departure from power. The outcome of the congressional elections will obviously impact the course of the domestic policy debate, but it is unlikely to mark a dramatic shift in the course of US foreign policy. The congressional changing of the guard may alter the rhetoric and accelerate tactical shifts in Iraq, but it will do nothing beyond that, since circumstances in Iraq irreversibly shifted long ago, developing an independent dynamic of their own. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation amounted to a cosmetic change, with no dramatic departures expected in US foreign policy. Much of the foreign policy of Bush’s second term was largely determined and limited to dealing with the consequences of the actions of the first term. Although bold action for major ground-breaking initiatives is still possible, the chances of success will be hampered by the Executive branch’s diminished leverage and political capital. Much will depend on Bush’s ability to seek common ground and work with the new Congress. Although Congress may influence the course of foreign policy, its direction ultimately emanates from the Executive branch. Therefore, the outcome of the elections is unlikely to result in any fundamental strategic re-think in foreign policy, particularly on the Middle East. This may be only possible with a change of president in 2008.
Marco Vicenzino is the founder and executive director of the Global Strategy Project and served as deputy executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US in Washington DC. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
