Washington may soon replace its failed regional policy of isolation and confrontation with a renewed policy of engagement. Correspondingly, Israel’s policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians is about to change as well. Here, Israel is faced with two dilemmas. First, whether to await an initiative designed by others or to preempt with its own ideas. And second, whether to reoccupy the Palestinian territories or seek tranquility with a Hamas-dominated government. What follows is a suggestion for the latter option applying to both dilemmas. Following the Hamas electoral victory, both the United States and Israel were convinced that an international financial and diplomatic boycott coupled with Israeli military pressure would force Hamas to make a choice: either accept the terms of the Quartet or be forced out of office. The implied assumption was that if Hamas did fail the test, Fatah would return to power. As Fatah showed no sign of rejuvenation, The US and Israel later sought refuge in the empty rhetoric of “strengthening Mahmoud Abbas. Yet, neither did much to strengthen Abbas when this was doable: when he was prime minister under President Yasser Arafat or when he was president with both the legislative and executive branches controlled by Fatah. Absent a Fatah alternative – at least for now – the choice for Israel is between resigning itself to a Hamas-dominated position within the Palestinian government and forcing Hamas’ failure. As the latter option spells ensuing chaos, which seems bound to force an Israeli reoccupation, the former may hold surprising promise. While some on the Israeli extreme right are rooting for a reoccupation, few if any in the civil and military decision-making circles wish to see that materialize. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is certainly hostile to the idea. A partner in Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan and committed to executing a sequel in the West Bank, Olmert was forced to shelve his realignment plan as violence in Lebanon and Gaza provoked greater Israeli public hostility to further unilateral steps. Ironically, it is acceptance of the Hamas electoral victory that can resurrect his plan, and under improved terms at that. The almost universal “all-or-nothing approach to the Quartet’s three conditions for accepting a Hamas-led government stuck a cork in the bottleneck of possible progress. By conditioning non-violence, which Hamas may be able to provide, on recognition of Israel’s right to exist, which it cannot, the Quartet has forsaken the prospect of needed tranquility in exchange for a form of official recognition that Israel does not need until a permanent-status agreement is on the agenda. By “bench-marking those conditions, Israel can remove the main obstacle to a deal whereby Hamas is allowed to govern provided it declares and implements a comprehensive ceasefire. It is only in such a context that Hamas may empower Abbas to enter into meaningful negotiations with Israel. For such negotiations to focus on a permanent-status agreement, this must be the objective of both parties. As this is not the case in the current Palestinian political reality, negotiations should focus on the convergence between the Hamas offer of “a framework for long term coexistence and a non-unilateral version of the Olmert “realignment. Contrary to some media reports, since taking office Hamas has repeatedly presented a vision that conditions implementation neither on an Israeli return to the pre-1967 border nor on the acceptance of the right of return. That vision comprises two “packages : First, a stabilization package, including an immediate cessation of all hostile acts by Hamas; a commitment to enforce the cessation on others within weeks; an immediate cessation of all hostile acts by Israel; a reopening of all passages; and after several weeks of Hamas delivery on these steps, a gradual Israeli release of withheld taxes and gradual relaxation of security measures (roadblocks, VIP transit, etc.). Second, a long term framework for coexistence: an understanding that will be in effect for 25 years and will involve: a complete mutual ceasefire constituting an end of the armed conflict; the eventual establishment of the independent state of Palestine and resolution of all permanent-status issues with the exception of refugees and Jerusalem (which are to be left for future generations); delineation of the border on the basis of the 1967 boundary; an expectation that Israel will remove settlers and settlements; an expectation that the Palestinians will acquire a foothold in areas related to Jerusalem. The Hamas leadership seems to have designed its message with the Israeli context in mind. Thus the “stabilization package offers an opportunity to test both intentions and capacity to implement without much risk, as within weeks Israel can reverse its gestures. This is even more the case with the second “package. Here, the language on border delineation implies acquiescence in land swaps. As for the last two “expectations , the first suggests Hamas’ cooperation in the implementation of Olmert’s realignment plan, thus addressing the concern of many Israelis with unilateralism; while the second echoes Olmert’s long-held position that the Palestinians can have a foothold in the outer neighborhoods of Jerusalem. By leaving the matter of recognition to a relevant future and by taking the short-term risk of enabling Hamas to govern via any version of a national unity government, Olmert can provide the residents of Sderot, Ashkelon and the rest of the country with the opportunity to experience a Qassam-free, far less violent environment, all within weeks. By so doing he may yet have a partner with whom to implement his election commitment for realignment, and with it change regional dynamics as well as revive his and Kadima’s prospects with the Israeli public. The option of reoccupation may become a necessity if Hamas fails the test. Isn’t it worth leaving it as the option of last resort?
Nimrod Novik, a businessman, is chairman of the Economic Cooperation Fund, an Israeli NGO that has been involved in all phases of the peace process. He was chief foreign policy adviser to Shimon Peres during his tenure as prime minister and foreign minister in the 1980s and early 1990s. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter publishing contending views of the Israeli Palestinian conflict.
