An Israeli-Palestinian discussion of the broad territorial, security and legal outlines of a Palestinian state is a good idea that has resurfaced for all the wrong reasons. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the current advocates of this approach of reversing the order of the Quartet’s “road map, did not invent it. Six months ago the idea that the Quartet would determine the border between Israel and Palestine and present it to the parties as a fait accompli was put forth by the moderate Arab camp. Another variation was the now defunct Sharon-Olmert plan for unilateral Israeli withdrawal as a means of dictating final borders. All these approaches reflect, first and foremost, desperation. The Palestinian government has proven itself incapable of stopping terrorism. Israel’s government is weak and can’t even dismantle a few outposts, much less curb settlement expansion. So much for phase I of the road map. The new proposal is reminiscent of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s resolve to negotiate peace as if there were no terrorism and fight terrorism as if there were no negotiations. Ultimately, the extremists won the day. Rice is also desperate to demonstrate progress in the Arab-Israel peace process for the benefit of the Europeans and the moderate Sunni Arab camp led by Saudi Arabia, so that they will cooperate with American policies in Iraq and regarding Iran. Since neither the Americans nor, apparently, the Saudis and Jordanians would welcome an Israeli-Syrian peace process, there remains only the Israeli-Palestinian track to work on. Rice’s approach also seemingly reflects ignorance. She has declared that all the elements of a successful peace process are well known to both sides; hence if only they would start talking it should be feasible for them to reach agreement. And agreement, in turn, would bolster Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ leadership against the challenge of Hamas. In reality, the sides are now farther apart than they were seven years ago at Camp David and according to the Clinton formula. For example, Israel then agreed to discuss limited repatriation of Palestinian refugees, whereas it now insists that any Palestinian “return be directed only to a Palestinian state. Moreover, subsequent events in Iraq and Iran, coupled with the failure of both Palestinians and Egyptians to prevent the large-scale exploitation of the Gaza-Sinai border for terrorism-related smuggling, require that Israel reexamine the notion of turning the Jordan Valley over to a Palestinian state at any time in the near future. Another failure at negotiating final-status issues would weaken rather than empower Abbas, who in any case appears too weak to deliver on a successful end-of-conflict agreement even if he could get one. The “diplomatic horizon approach of reversing the road map appears to follow the conflict resolution principle that “if you can’t solve a small problem, then enlarge it. Sometimes that works; often it fails. However, if we’re going to invoke that principle, why not go all the way and place the final-status issues in the context of the Arab peace plan. Conceivably, just as the Saudi leadership was able to get Hamas and Fatah together in a unity government, Saudi and other Arab pressure and inducements could be brought to bear on the Palestinians to offer the concessions necessary for making the diplomatic horizon work. True, Israel traditionally has much to fear from the comprehensive solution concept. The Arab world and much of the Quartet could gang up on the Israelis and pressure them to make far-reaching concessions. Yet for the next two years at least, Israel will have the Bush administration solidly behind it. It has reason to conclude that the Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians and Emiratis fear Hamas, Hizbullah, Iran and a Shiite-dominated Iraq as much as it does. It can legitimately demand a quid pro quo of close security cooperation with much of the Arab world against the dangers from Iran and an anarchic post-occupation Iraq. Here, then, is a road leading to a diplomatic horizon that is worth exploring. It requires a Saudi decision to lead the Arab world in face-to-face dialogue with Israel on a level playing field. This approach has a better chance of success than the Bush administration’s continued bumbling in the region. Yossi Alpheris a former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and was a senior adviser to Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter publishing contending views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Use the Arab peace plan to tackle final-status issues
