The idea of a separation barrier between Israel and the Palestinians, including a “separation fence, was first broached during the premiership of Yitzhak Rabin and again under Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, but remained dormant. Increased suicide bombings during Ariel Sharon’s tenure generated public and political pressure to build a fence that would prevent infiltration. Sharon, faithful to his ideology, initially avoided any activity that could create even the appearance of a “border between Israel and the Palestinians. But in April 2002 he overcame his natural reluctance and yielded to public pressure. He acknowledged that Israel’s “sense of security had been lost and decided to construct a security fence that would create a barrier between Israel and the Palestinians and improve both security and the sense of security. In order to provide security for Israel and its strategic, military and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the “green line, a path was chosen for the fence that was in places on or near the line and in others to its east. This twisting and complex location created political, humanitarian and economic problems, thereby posing the question: Was the fence intended for security or for political ends – among them the annexation of Palestinian territories and expansion of Israeli settlements? Growing domestic and international criticism and pressure from the courts soon led to a significant alteration in the path of the fence at Baqa Al-Gharbia, moving it closer to the “green line. The protests also led to the convening of the International Court of Justice at The Hague that, in an advisory decision in July 2004, determined that the fence violated international law, harmed the Palestinians and their rights. Further, in a precedent-setting decision in June 2004 regarding the fence near the village of Bet Furiq, the Israel High Court ruled that the fence was legal as a security measure, but that its path had to reflect proportionality with regard to Israel’s obligations toward the fabric of Palestinian life. This decision, additional appeals to the courts and ongoing criticism generated a process intended to locate the existing fence in a more balanced and proportional manner and to alter planning of additional sections. Changes are planned in fence sections at the villages of Bartaa, Jayous and Palma, the settlement of Alfei Menashe and elsewhere, though court proceedings and planning constraints have generated considerable delays. Thus far, around 180 appeals have been made to the High Court of which some 50 are still pending. Work on the fence, which was to be completed by the end of 2005, will probably continue past 2007. Along the 780 kilometers of fence that is planned, there will be over 30 passages for economic interaction and the movement of people and goods. Another 60-70 gates are planned for Palestinian farmers to work lands on the other side of the fence (13 passages and about 30 agriculture gates are already active). All told, some 420 km of fence are operational, of which about 34 km (in the Jerusalem, Qalqilya and Tulkarm areas) are constructed in the form of concrete walls. At the security level, not a single infiltration of Israel has been carried out through the operational sections of the fence, and the overall number of attacks has declined precipitously. Terrorists have been forced to seek out areas to infiltrate where there is no fence and in the Jerusalem region. For example, the few successful attacks perpetrated in Israel (in Netanya and Tel Aviv) over the past year were carried out by individuals whose point of departure was Jenin and Nablus and who made a wide detour to avoid the fence, which they could not penetrate. Security sources estimate that upon completion of the fence and its passageways, the capacity to carry out attacks on the ground inside Israel will be radically reduced. The distance between the fence and the “green line, the inclusion within the fence of settlement concentrations, and the obstacles created to the free movement of Palestinians have generated suspicions at both the local Palestinian and the international level that Israel is, in fact, cantonizing Palestine and is not interested in the emergence of an independent Palestinian state. This accusation focuses on the political significance of the fence. Israel’s formal response is that the fence is temporary, and that upon reaching an agreed solution to the conflict the fence can be moved, just as it was on the Israel-Lebanon border in 2000. The fence in the Jerusalem area presents a complex and complicated issue. Tens of thousands of Palestinian and Israeli ID-card holders have had to adjust to a new status beyond the fence, with constraints on entering and leaving the city. In East Jerusalem and Maaleh Adumim, the planned path of the fence encompasses extensive Palestinian territories, thus mandating further study before completion. Whether the current fence line in and around Jerusalem is the right proportional line from the standpoint of political, economic, demographic and international considerations remains an open question. In my view, the line will have to undergo additional amendments. In contrast, from southern Jerusalem-Etzion Bloc and south to the Hebron-Judean Desert area, the path of the fence is close to the “green line and thus less controversial. The fence, then, is not just a security issue. Today, in the absence of an agreed solution or even negotiations, Israel continues to make unilateral decisions. The path of the fence has far-reaching international, economic, social and humanitarian ramifications whose legal consequences generate a dynamic situation and render imprecise the fence’s final shape and location. This, in turn, makes it impossible to assess precisely how much of the West Bank will remain “inside the fence (somewhere between 9.5-13 percent). In future negotiations, Israel will have to relate to the fence in ways that afford a dignified political, economic, social and humanitarian fabric of Palestinian life without compromising Israeli security. Baruch Spiegelhas served as special adviser to Israel’s defense minister for Palestinian fabric-of-life issues, where he dealt with matters relating to the fence, passages, checkpoints, settlements and outposts. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter publishing contending views of he Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Balancing Israel's barrier with the Palestinians' fabric of life
