From 2002 until late 2005, with international concern about Iran’s nuclear file at a record high, the reaction in Arab states to Iran’s activities might best be described as a resounding silence. As the international community grappled with the implications of the emerging threat and the means to convince Iran to back down, Arab states in Iran’s neighborhood were not voicing any real concern. At times they even supported Iran, as witnessed at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference of 2005 when Egypt stood by Iran’s attempts to deflect attention from itself in favor of greater emphasis on Israel. The assessment in these states was most likely that the United States and Europe were working hard to curb Iran’s nuclear activity and would hopefully take care of the problem for them. This would enable them (especially in the Gulf) to avoid making the kind of statements that might antagonize their powerful neighbor. Added to this was the impact of the double-standards argument that is so widespread in Arab societies, according to which criticism of any nuclear activity in an Arab or Muslim state is frowned upon as long as Israel is granted relative immunity in the nuclear realm. What changed toward the end of 2005 was the growing realization that efforts to stop Iran were not succeeding and that the race against time might end with a victory for Iran. With the prospect of a nuclear Iran becoming more real, the Gulf states in particular began to more openly express their opposition and fear. But the question is whether their increasingly open criticism of Iran means that we will see a real shift in their behavior as well. The ability of these states to directly confront Iran or convince it to change course is actually quite limited, especially when one considers all that is being attempted by the much stronger international community. Moreover, the Gulf states have for years depended on the US to ensure their security. Nevertheless, in late 2005 these same states came up with the idea of creating a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Gulf. This was an important variation on the well-known proposal to create such a zone for the entire Middle East; it highlighted the Gulf states’ intention to focus on Iran in particular, at least in the initial stage. The idea did not gain momentum, and one of the constraints was the double-standards argument regarding Israel. One way of attempting to confront the direct security threat of a nuclear Iran is for these states to enhance their own military capabilities. In the conventional realm, Gulf states have in recent months been uncharacteristically vocal about their arms acquisitions and the need to create a military deterrent against Iran. Deterrence could also be bolstered by parallel nuclear capabilities. In fact, reports over the past six months have identified quite a few states in the Middle East – including Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council states as a group – that have made known their intention to develop a civilian nuclear program. Not surprisingly, these reports have sparked concern that the true aim behind these programs is a nuclear weapons capability reflecting fears linked directly to Iran. But while the fear of additional proliferation in the Middle East is prevalent, for most states a nuclear capability is not likely to materialize anytime soon. The nuclear route is very costly in both economic and political terms (as demonstrated by the case of Iran itself). Nevertheless, many in the region would like to get the message across that they are not content to simply sit back and watch as Iran becomes a nuclear state. After the Lebanon war last summer, regional states are also looking at Iran’s nuclear activity in geopolitical terms. The war emphasized and underscored the nature and extent of Iran’s regional hegemonic designs, namely its desire to call the shots not only in the Persian Gulf but in the wider Middle East as well. A nuclear capability would give these designs a significant boost. Understanding this central concern with respect to Iran’s nuclear activity brings into sharper focus another direction for responding to Iran: political activity to counter its enhanced regional power. Saudi Arabia is most concerned with Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestinian politics, and has recently taken clear steps to counter it by bolstering its own regional role – including by hosting the Hamas-Fatah meeting in Mecca. With his visit to Saudi Arabia, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seemed to be hoping to defuse this uncomfortable competition, and to project the image of two states that are actually partners in resisting imperialist plans to divide the Muslim world. But Saudi Arabia continues to criticize Iran’s nuclear ambitions and to advocate its own right to a nuclear program. There has also been talk of forging a coalition of moderate states in the Middle East in order to confront the radical camp led by Iran. The idea is that status quo Arab states and Israel have a common interest in curbing radical forces that want to stir up trouble in the region. There was some initial movement in this direction in the immediate aftermath of the Lebanon war, but anything more substantial would be difficult to sustain over the long-term, especially with Israel involved. A breakthrough on the Israeli-Palestinian front might be a facilitating factor, and while that does not seem to be on the short-term horizon, there could be some movement on reviving the Saudi peace initiative in the coming weeks. In sum, Iran’s nuclear activities have sparked new and more vocal concerns in the region and could engender dangerous arms races and even nuclear proliferation down the road. There are political options that can be pursued to counter Iran’s hegemonic ambitions, but it needs to be recognized that normative resistance to Israel is hindering coordination that could build on the common interest to contain a very serious regional threat. A revived peace initiative could help. Emily B. Landauis senior research associate and director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
Arabs worry about Iran, but their focus is on Israel
