Lebanon is unique among the Arab countries in being a democratic system based on parliamentary representation. In this regard, it is comparable to the political systems of other modern democracies around the world. However, Lebanese democracy was never able to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, respect for sectarian diversity and the securing, through fair elections, of a ruling political majority representing all confessional groups; and, on the other, an opposition minority that includes representatives of all sectarian groups. This deficiency has engendered a system that is closer to a confederation of confessional groups than a true democracy where priority is given to citizenship and political programs. Since late 2006, this has caused the paralysis of constitutional institutions, exacerbated by the obstruction of Parliament and the withdrawal from the government of ministers belonging to the key Shiite community. Moreover, the executive branch is split because the president has denied the government legitimacy, while new signs of sectarian cleavages are appearing throughout Lebanon. The Lebanese thus face two choices: either to preserve the current system of government, which has led to political gridlock and the disintegration of the state into a loose confederation of confessional groups; or to embrace the various confessional groups within a new electoral law that can ensure national unity, founded upon values of citizenship and a national political program that overrules narrow sectarian allegiances. The second choice is reminiscent of a bygone era in Lebanon when politics were shaped by the predominance of two major political currents: the Constitutional Bloc versus the National Bloc in the 1950s or the pro-Camille Chamoun Hilf versus the pro-Fouad Chehab Nahj throughout the 1960s. During that period, the election of President Suleiman Franjieh in 1970 by a one-vote majority was still possible. In other words, the aim of any new electoral law must be to create a major shift in Lebanon’s political system, such that all sects would be represented in competing political movements defined by overarching citizenship values and a commitment to defined political programs. On Aug. 8, 2005, the government established a national commission for electoral law reform, headed by a former foreign minister, Fouad Boutros. The commission has performed an important task in recommending reforms, such as introducing voting rights for Lebanese emigrants, instituting positive discrimination in favor of women’s participation in electoral lists, regulating election campaign advertising and spending, forming an independent committee in charge of administering the election process, lowering the voting age to 18, and adopting the concept of closed electoral lists. Yet despite all these positive steps, the draft electoral plan agreed by the Boutros commission falls short of securing a ruling national multiconfessional majority, alongside a national multiconfessional opposition minority. This bipolarity is crucial in modern democracies. In order to avoid such pitfalls, I have presented my own proposal that rests on the following pillars: First, the drawing of a geographically-consistent electoral map that secures a balance between electoral districts, by merging adjacent and economically integrated qadas, or smaller districts. The number of seats in the new electoral districts would vary between seven and 11, with an overall total of 15 electoral districts. Second, the adoption of a closed list system. This guarantees that candidates running on the same list will agree to the same political agenda. The system also facilitates the computation of proportions of seat distribution should a proportional electoral system be adopted, unlike the majority system that is currently in place. Third, the formation of national coalitions between different electoral lists around a comprehensive national agenda that candidates would publicly have to commit to in front of their constituencies. No list would be allowed to run for elections in a given district unless it has joined a national coalition that is running lists in most districts. The proposal aims to provide a link between two necessities: The first is to secure a ruling political majority that is democratically opposed by an elected minority, as in other democracies around the world. The second, more specific to the Lebanese context, is to secure representation for all confession groups according to predetermined shares. In other words, the project aims to reconcile bipolar and non-confessional political representation, necessary for democratic governance, with the confessional diversity needed to secure peace and stability in Lebanon. This proposed electoral concept would ensure balance in parliamentary representation, along confessional lines, as well as true political representation for all districts in a bipolar system with a fairly elected majority and minority. The proposal would also avoid the renewal of the inefficient “consensus democracy system that requires the unanimous approval of minorities and majorities in running the affairs of state. This is in contradiction with internationally applicable constitutional rules – specifically with the proper management of government, which cannot afford to delay decisions pending the agreement of all parties. Indeed, the new proposal creates a ruling majority and an opposing minority, both of which are balanced in terms of confessional and geographical representation. The choice we face is between a system that establishes a confederation of confessions, which will eventually lead to the collapse of the state; and the founding of an electoral system that guarantees national unity, with citizenship superseding confessionalism. ……… Charles Rizk is Lebanon’s justice minister. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
Lebanon can use bipolar electoral order
