“For 35 years the sun did not shine here, said a man on the grounds of the great Shia shrine of Al-Kadhimiyyah, on the outskirts of Baghdad. I had come to the shrine at night, in the company of the Shia politician Ahmed Chalabi. We had driven in an armed convoy, and our presence had drawn a crowd. The place was bathed with light, framed by multiple minarets – a huge rectangular structure, its beauty and dereliction side by side. The tile work was exquisite, there were deep Persian carpets everywhere, the gifts of benefactors, rulers and merchants, drawn from the world of Shiism. It was a cool spring night, and beguilingly tranquil. (There were the echoes of a firefight across the river, from the Sunni neighborhood of Al-Adhamiyyah, but it was background noise and oddly easy to ignore.) A keeper of the shrine had been showing us the place, and he was proud of its doors made of teak from Burma – a kind of wood, he said, that resisted rain, wind and sun. It was to that description that the quiet man on the edge of this gathering had offered the thought that the sun had not risen during the long night of Baathist despotism. A traveler who moves between Baghdad and Washington is struck by the gloomy despair in Washington and the cautious sense of optimism in Baghdad. Baghdad has not been prettified; its streets remain an eyesore, its government still hunkered down in the Green Zone, and violence is never far away. But the sense of deliverance and the hopes invested in the new American security plan are palpable. I crisscrossed the city – always with armed protection – making my way to Sunni and Shia politicians and clerics alike. The Sunni and Shia versions of political things – of reality itself – remain at odds. But there can be discerned, through the acrimony, the emergence of a fragile consensus. Some months back, the Bush administration had called into question both the intentions and capabilities of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. But this modest and earnest man, born in 1950, a child of the Shia mainstream in the Middle Euphrates, has come into his own. He had not been a figure of the American regency in Baghdad. Steeped entirely in the Arabic language and culture, he had a been a stranger to the Americans; fate cast him on the scene when the Americans pushed aside Maliki’s colleague in the Daawa Party, Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari. There had been rumors that the Americans could strike again in their search for a leader who would give the American presence better cover. There had been steady talk that the old CIA standby, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, could make his way back to power. Allawi himself had fed these speculations, but this is fantasy. Allawi circles Arab capitals and is rarely at home in his own country. Maliki meanwhile has settled into his role. In retrospect, the defining moment for Maliki had been those early hours of last December 30, when Saddam Hussein was sent to the gallows. He had not flinched, the decision was his, and he assumed it. Beyond the sound and fury of the controversy that greeted the execution, Maliki had taken the execution as a warrant for a new accommodation with the Sunni political class. A lifelong opponent of the Baath party, he had come to the opinion that the back of the apparatus of the old regime had been broken, and that the time had come to offer an olive branch to those ready to accept the new political rules. When I called on Maliki at his residence, a law offering pensions to the former officers of the Iraqi Army had been readied and was soon put into effect. That decision had been supported by the head of the de-Baathification commission, Ahmed Chalabi. A proposal for a deeper reversal of the de-Baathification process was in the works, and would be announced days later by Maliki and President Jalal Talabani. This was in truth the former US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad’s doing, his attempt to bury the entire de-Baathification effort as his tenure drew to a close. This was more than the political traffic in the Shia community could bear. Few were ready to accept the return of old Baathists to government service. The victims of the old terror were appalled at a piece of this legislation, giving them a period of only three months to bring charges against their former tormentors. This had not been Maliki’s choice – for his animus toward the Baath party has been the driving force of his political life. It was known that he trusted that the religious hierarchy in Najaf, and the forces within the Shia alliance, would rein in this drive toward rehabilitating the remnants of the old regime. Power and experience have clearly changed Maliki as he makes his way between the Shia coalition that sustains him on the one hand, and the American presence on the other. By all accounts, he is increasingly independent of the diehards in his own coalition – another dividend of the high-profile executions of Saddam Hussein and three of the tyrant’s principal lieutenants. He is surrounded by old associates drawn from the Daawa Party, but keeps his own counsel. There is a built-in tension between a prime minister keen to press for his own prerogatives and an American military presence that underpins the security of this new order. Maliki does not have the access to American military arms he would like; he does not have control over an Iraqi special forces brigade that the Americans had trained and nurtured. His police forces remain poorly equipped. The levers of power are not fully his, and he knows it. Not a student of American ways – he spent his years of exile mostly in Syria – he is fully aware of the American exhaustion with Iraq as leading American politicians have come his way often. The nightmare of this government is that of a precipitous American withdrawal. Six months ago, the British quit the southern city of Amara, the capital of Maysan Province. It had been, by Iraqi accounts, a precipitous British decision, and the forces of Moqtada Al-Sadr had rushed into the void; they had looted the barracks and overpowered the police. Amara haunts the Iraqis in the circle of power – the prospect of Americans leaving this government to fend for itself. In the long scheme of history, the Shia Arabs had never governed – and Maliki and the coalition spread around him know their isolation in the region. This Iraqi state of which they had become the principal inheritors will have to make its way in a hostile regional landscape. Set aside Turkey’s Islamist government, with its avowedly Sunni mindset and its sense of itself as a claimant to an older Ottoman tradition; the Arab order of power is yet to make room for this Iraqi state. Maliki’s first trip beyond Iraq’s borders had been to Saudi Arabia. He had meant that visit as a message that Iraq’s “Arab identity will trump all other orientations. It had been a message that the Arab world’s Shia stepchildren were ready to come into the fold. But a huge historical contest had erupted in Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliphate had fallen to new Shia inheritors, and the custodians of Arab power were not yet ready for this new history. For one, the “Sunni street – the Islamists, the pan-Arabists who hid their anti-Shia animus underneath a secular cover, the intellectual class that had been invested in the ideology of the Baath party – remained unalterably opposed to this new Iraq. The Shias could offer the Arab rulers the promise that their new state would refrain from regional adventures, but it would not be easy for these rulers to come to this accommodation. A worldly Shia cleric, the legislator Humam Hamoudi who had headed the constitutional drafting committee, told me that he had laid out to interlocutors from the House of Saud the case that this new Iraqi state would be a better neighbor than the Sunni-based state of Saddam Hussein had been. “We would not be given to military adventures beyond our borders, what wealth we have at our disposal would have to go to repairing our homeland, for you we would be easier to fend off for we are Shias and would be cognizant and respectful of the d
ifferences between us, Hamoudi had said. “You had a fellow Sunni in Baghdad for more than three decades, and look what terrible harvest, what wreckage, he left behind. This sort of appeal is yet to be heard, for this change in Baghdad is a break with a long millennium of Sunni Arab primacy. The blunt truth of this new phase in the fight for Iraq is that the Sunnis have lost the battle for Baghdad. The great flight from Baghdad to Jordan, to Syria, to other Arab destinations, has been the flight of Baghdad’s Sunni middle class. It is they who had the means of escape, and the savings. Whole mixed districts in the city – Rasafa, Karkh – have been emptied of their Sunni populations. Even the old Sunni neighborhood of Al-Adhamiyyah is embattled and besieged. What remains for the Sunnis are the western outskirts. This was the tragic logic of the campaign of terror waged by the Baathists and the jihadists against the Shias; this was what played out in the terrible year that followed the attack on the Askariyya shrine of Samarra in February 2006. Possessed of an old notion of their own dominion, and of Shia passivity and quiescence, the Sunni Arabs waged a war they were destined to lose. No one knows with any precision the sectarian composition of today’s Baghdad, but there are estimates that the Sunnis may now account for 15 percent of the city’s population. Behind closed doors, Sunni leaders speak of the great calamity that befell their community. They admit to a great disappointment in the Arab states that fed the flames but could never alter the contest on the ground in Iraq. No Arab cavalry had ridden, or was ever going to ride, to the rescue of the Sunnis of Iraq. A cultured member of the (Sunni) Association of Muslim Scholars in Baghdad, a younger man of deep moderation, likened the dilemma of his community to that of the Palestinian Arabs since 1948. “They waited for deliverance that never came, he said. “Like them, we placed our hopes in Arab leaders who have their own concerns. We fell for those Arab satellite channels; we believed that Arab brigades would turn up in Anbar and Baghdad. We made room for Al-Qaeda only to have them turn on us in Anbar. There had once been a Sunni maxim in Iraq, “for us ruling and power, for you self-flagellation, that branded the Shias as a people of sorrow and quietism. Now the ground has shifted, and among the Sunnis there is a widespread sentiment of disinheritance and loss. The Mehdi Army, more precisely the underclass of Sadr City, had won the fight for Baghdad. This Shia underclass had been hurled into the city from its ancestral lands in the Marshes and the Middle Euphrates. In a cruel twist of irony, Baathist terror had driven these people into the slums of Baghdad. The Baathist tyranny had cut down the palm trees in the south, burned the reed beds of the Marshes. Then the campaign of terror that Sunni society sheltered and abetted in the aftermath of the despot’s fall gave the Mehdi Army its cause and its power. “The Mehdi Army protected us and our lands, our homes, and our honor, said a tribal Shia notable in a meeting in Baghdad, acknowledging that it was perhaps time for the boys of Moqtada Al-Sadr to step aside in favor of the government forces. He laid bare, as he spoke, the terrible complications of this country; six of his sisters, he said, were married to Sunnis, countless nephews of his were Sunni. Violence had hacked away at this pluralism; no one could be certain when, and if, the place could mend. In their grief, the Sunni Arabs have fallen back on the most unexpected of hopes; having warred against the Americans, they now see them as redeemers. “This government is an American creation, a powerful Sunni legislator, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, said. “It is up to the Americans to replace it, change the Constitution that was imposed on us, replace this incompetent, sectarian government with a government of national unity, a cabinet of technocrats. Shrewd and alert to the ways of the world (he has a PhD in soil science from a university in the United Kingdom) Mutlaq gave voice to a wider Sunni conviction that this order in Baghdad is but an American puppet. America and Iran may be at odds in the region, but the Sunni Arabs see an American-Persian conspiracy that had robbed them of their patrimony. They had made their own bed, the Sunni Arabs, but old habits of dominion die hard, and save but for a few, there is precious little acknowledgment of the wages of the terror that the Shias had been subjected to in the years that followed the American invasion. As matters stand, the Sunni Arabs are in desperate need of leaders who can call off the violence, cut a favorable deal for their community, and distance that community form the temptations and the ruin of the insurgency. It is late in the hour, but there is still eagerness in the Maliki government to conciliate the Sunnis, if only to give the country a chance at normalcy. The Shias have come into their own, but there still hovers over them their old history of dispossession; there still trails shadows of doubt about their hold on power, about conspiracies hatched against them in neighboring Arab lands. The Americans have given birth to this new Shia primacy, but there lingers a fear, in the inner circles of the Shia coalition, that the Americans have in mind a Sunni-based army, of the Pakistani and Turkish mold, that would upend the democratic, majoritarian bases of power on which Shia primacy rests. They are keenly aware, these new Shia men of power in Baghdad, that the Pax Americana in the region is based on an alliance of long standing with the Sunni regimes. They are under no illusions about their own access to Washington when compared with that of leaders in Cairo, Riyadh, Amman and the smaller principalities of the Persian Gulf. This suspicion is in the nature of things; it is the way of once marginal men who had come into an unexpected triumph. In truth, it is not only the Arab order of power that remains ill at ease with the rise of the Shias of Iraq. The (Shia) genie that came out of the bottle was not fully to America’s liking. Indeed, the United States’ strategy in Iraq had tried to sidestep the history that America itself had given birth to. There had been the disastrous regency of Paul Bremer. It had been followed by the attempt to create a national security state under Iyad Allawi. Then there had come the strategy of the American envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, that aimed to bring the Sunni leadership into the political process and wean them away from the terror and the insurgency. Khalilzad had become, in his own sense of himself, something of a High Commissioner in Iraq, and his strategy had ended in failure; the Sunni leaders never broke with the insurgency. Their sobriety of late has been a function of the defeat their cause has suffered on the ground; all the inducements had not worked. We are now in a new, and fourth, phase of this American presence. We should not try to “cheat in the region, conceal what we had done, or apologize for it, by floating an Arab-Israeli peace process to the liking of the “Sunni street. The Arabs have an unerring feel for the ways of strangers who venture into their lands. Deep down, the Sunni Arabs know what the fight for Baghdad is all about – oil wealth and power, the balance between the Sunni edifice of material and moral power and the claims of the Shia stepchildren. To this fight, Iran is a newcomer, an outlier. This is an old Arab account, the fight between the order of merchants and rulers and establishment jurists on the one side, and the righteous (Shia) oppositionists on the other. How apt it is that the struggle that had been fought on the plains of Karbala in southern Iraq so long ago has now returned, full circle, to Iraq. For our part, the US can’t give full credence to the Sunni representations of things. We can cushion the Sunni defeat but can’t reverse it. Our soldiers have not waged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq against Sunni extremists to fall for the fear of some imagined “Shia crescent peddled by Sunni rulers and preachers. To that atavistic figh
t between Sunni and Shia, we ought to remain decent and discerning arbiters. To be sure, in Iraq itself we can’t give a blank check to Shia maximalism. On its own, mainstream Shiism is eager to rein in its own diehards and self-anointed avengers. There is a growing Shia unease with the Mehdi Army – and with the venality and incompetence of the Sadrists, represented in the Cabinet until a few days ago – and an increasing faith that the government and its instruments of order are the surer bet. The crackdown on the Mehdi Army that the new American commander, General David Petraeus, has launched has the backing of the ruling Shia coalition. Iraqi police and army units have taken to the field against elements of the Mehdi army. Recently, in the southern city of Diwaniyya, American and Iraqi forces together battled the forces of Moqtada al-Sadr. To the extent that the Shias now see Iraq as their own country, their tolerance for mayhem and chaos has receded. Sadr may damn the American occupiers, but ordinary Shia men and women know that the liberty that came their way had been a gift of the Americans. The young men of little education – earnest displaced villagers with the ways of the countryside showing through their features and dialect and shiny suits – who guarded me through Baghdad, spoke of old terrors, and of the joy and dignity of this new order. Children and nephews and younger brothers of men lost to the terror of the Baath party, they are done with the old servitude. They behold the Americans keeping the peace of their troubled land with undisguised gratitude. It hasn’t been always brilliant, this campaign waged in Iraq. But its mistakes can never smother its honor, and no apology for it is due the Arab autocrats who had averted their gaze from Iraq’s long night of terror under the Baath party. One can never reconcile the beneficiaries of illegitimate, abnormal power to the end of their dominion. But this current realignment in Iraq carries with it a gift for the possible redemption of modern Islam among the Arabs. Hitherto Sunni Islam had taken its hegemony for granted and extremist strands within it have shown a refusal to accept “the other. Conversely, Shia history has been distorted by weakness and exclusion and by a concomitant abdication of responsibility. A Shia-led state in Iraq – with a strong Kurdish presence in it and a big niche for the Sunnis – can go a long way toward changing the region’s terrible habits and expectations of authority and command. The Sunnis would still be hegemonic in the Arab councils of power beyond Iraq, but their monopoly would yield to the pluralism and complexity of that region. “Watch your adjectives is the admonition given American officers by Petraeus. In Baghdad, Americans and Iraqis alike know that this big endeavor has entered its final, decisive phase. Iraq has surprised and disappointed us before, but as both the Iraqis and we watch our adjectives there can be discerned the shape of a new country, a rough balance of forces commensurate with the demography of the place and with the outcome of a war that its erstwhile Sunni rulers had launched and lost. We made this history and should now make our peace with it. Fouad Ajami,a 2006 recipient of the Bradley Prize, teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Affairs in Washington DC. He is the author of “The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq (Free Press, 2006). THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary, which first appeared in The Wall Street Journal, by permission.
In Iraq, cautious optimism with the overturning of an illegitimate Arab order
