The Saudi Shia news service Al-Rasid released its second annual human rights report in late April. The document is a survey of discriminatory practices against the kingdom’s Shia minority. Noting a palpable stall in government reform efforts, the report cited the influence of Salafist hardliners in the clerical bureaucracy who dissuaded the ruling family from codifying further concessions to Shia identity. Other Shia activists have pointed to the stagnating effect of the wars in Lebanon and Iraq on the integration of the Shias and on reform in general.
An often-quoted phrase attributed to the late King Fahd has acquired new resonance, especially in the Eastern Province: “Why start fires on the inside, when there are fires on the outside?
The resulting loss of momentum has caused many Shias to lose faith in official channels for reform such as the National Dialogue and the municipal councils. Consequently, Shia activists and clerics stand at a crossroads. Some, such as the cleric Nimr al-Nimr, have pursued a militant line, stirring fears of a resurgent Saudi Hezbollah. More moderate figures such as Hassan al-Saffar, Jaafar al-Shayeb, and Muhammad Mahfouz have adopted new tactics that augment the regime-sanctioned channels and focus on building cross-sectarian ties. The ultimate goal, according to one activist, is to create “space for the middle and to diminish the appeal of sectarian mobilization advocated by radicals in both camps.
Seeking to counteract suspicions that Shias constitute an Iranian “fifth column, some Shia intellectuals have pushed for Saudi-based clerical training in order to create a Saudi Shia marjaa al-taqlid (clerical source of emulation). In their view, this would expedite the national integration of Shias and remove any basis for accusing them of loyalty to foreign authority.
Advocates of this policy point to a Saudi government precedent in creating indigenous theological schools to mitigate outside influence. For example, they cite the establishment of Imam Ibn Saud University in 1974 to counter Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood teaching at the Islamic University of Medina. It should be noted, however, that this initiative does not enjoy universal support among Shia activists; secularists argue that reducing the power of the clerics is a necessary first step in reforming “Shia-ism before any national integration can be accomplished.
Shia intellectuals also play a role in dialogue with the Sunnis. Scholar Muhammad Mahfouz, for example, this year published an edited volume entitled “Sectarian Dialogue in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The book includes contributions from noted scholars from Sunni and Shia schools of thought – Malikis, Hanbalis, Shafiis, Hanafis, Zaydis, Ismailis and Twelver Shias – across the country, and presents a nuanced revision of previous attempts at “rapprochement , or taqrib, arguing instead for fraternity, or ta’akhi.
Shia activists are also continuing a long-standing practice of dialogue and partnering with Salafist reformists in the western party of the country, who serve as what one figure described as a “strike force for reform, deep within the Najd (the central province of Saudi Arabia from which the ruling family hails, and the birthplace of Wahhabism).
Other efforts at inter-sectarian dialogue include Hassan al-Saffar’s recent visit to the Salafist stronghold of al-Unayza and his invitation from clerics from Al-Burayda, also a Salafist bastion, to visit the east. But by their own admission, the Shia cooperation with other sects in the kingdom has remained mostly at the informal level, through e-mails, personal contacts, and the occasional publishing of joint manifestos. Disagreements between Shias and Salafists about reform priorities – particularly about the inclusion of women’s rights – are common.
At the local level, Shias point to the long-standing good relations between Sunnis and Shias living in the Eastern Province as a buffer against Salafist puritanism, which many view as an import from the Najd. Local economic interdependence and social geography play a critical role in tempering the impact of this ideology and reducing the possibility of a spillover of Iraq’s sectarian carnage. While there are acknowledged pockets of sectarian radicalism in provincial towns (Al-Awamiyya for Shias and Al-Anq for Salafists), shared schools, courts, public parks and civil defense forces encourage Shia-Sunni harmony.
Whether local efforts at coexistence will translate into willingness by the Al-Saud to re-energize reforms toward the Shias is unclear. In any case, these recent initiatives have had the effect of keeping Shias engaged in dialogue and political activism and of preventing frustration at the sluggish pace of reforms from spiraling into widespread radicalism.
Ironically, the Al-Saud may not fully acknowledge such benefits, and might actually impede them by positioning themselves as what one activist called “the doorway through which all attempts at sectarian dialogue must pass. Fred Wehreyis an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and recently returned from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. This commentary is reprinted with permission from the Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 5, issue 5 (June 2007) www.CarnegieEndowment.org/ArabReform © 2007, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
