In the long history of Egyptian-Palestinian relations, and in particular the relationship between Egypt and Gaza, there has been nothing to rival the current crisis in Gaza for intensity and for the implications it holds for future stability in the area. While it is too early to tell whether a fundamentally different relationship will develop between Egypt and Palestinians over Gaza, it is certain that Egyptian policy choices in the period ahead will be fraught with contradictory impulses. In the end, Egyptian decision-makers may not be able to decide what to do.
At least four vital national security interests come into play within Egyptian decision-making related to Gaza. For a political system in Egypt beset by its own internal and external challenges, the crisis in Gaza could not have come at a worse time. For example, there is no vice president and thus no constitutionally-sanctioned successor in line; the political system is sclerotic and subject to increasing pressures from within; and Saudi diplomacy has been more agile and deft than Egyptian diplomacy, resulting in Saudi Arabia all but displacing Egypt as the locus of moderate Arab decision-making.
Egypt’s primary self-interest for decades has been the maintenance of stability. Almost all external politics are assessed first through the prism of how they play on the “Arab street and where the Egyptian regime must position itself so as to alienate the fewest Egyptian citizens as possible. When it was Israel attacking Palestinians in Gaza in response to or in preemption of Palestinian violence, the choice for Egypt was easy: blame Israel and demand an end to the occupation. Since the 2005 disengagement, however, and more recently with Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, the Egyptian regime is unsure where its policy should be positioned so as to maintain calm on Cairo’s streets.
The second factor in Egyptian thinking is the spillover effect of events in Gaza. Egypt’s long-term complacency about the security situation in Gaza came to a shocking and abrupt end two years ago, when Israel pulled out its settlers and army. Not only did Egypt find itself face to face with Palestinians without an Israeli buffer, but Egypt also was a target of Palestinian terrorism in Sinai. The Gaza border suddenly became Egypt’s problem. Yet two years later, it is unclear whether Egypt has the resolve to take the actions necessary to ensure security on that border.
The third issue on the minds of Egypt’s leaders relates to the implications of Hamas’ ascendancy for Egypt’s own Islamist movements. The Egyptians have pursued a combination of sophisticated political actions and brute force against militant Islamist groups operating in Egypt. The Egyptian security services have been unafraid to fight the Islamists whenever the regime has told them to do so, but equally, the security chiefs have found it beneficial to reach tactical, temporary accommodations with the Islamists when it has suited the regime. As long as Egypt’s Islamist problems were confined to Egypt, the regime and the security services seemed well-prepared to deal with the problem.
The question now, however, is whether Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, just 18 months after its electoral victory, will embolden Egypt’s Islamists and give them reason to believe time and political trends are operating in their favor. For an Egyptian regime that had been confident of its ability to “tame Hamas and insistent that Hamas be accepted as part of Palestinian politics, this specter of Hamas as an example that Egyptian Islamists may seek to emulate has got to be terrifying.
The fourth factor in Egyptian thinking relates to the overall instability of the region and the uncertainty surrounding US policy, the future of Iraq, the direction in which the Syrian-Lebanese problem will go, and the nuclear aspirations of Iran. The Egyptian leadership recognizes that there is no single answer to all of these national security challenges, but it is reeling from the introduction of yet another crisis in this volatile mix. Just three months ago, the so-called “Arab Quartet was hoping that a reaffirmed Arab peace initiative would be seized upon by Israel and the United States to launch a political process that, at a minimum, would defuse some of the pressures building up in the region. Today, the Arab initiative is not relevant and no one–not Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, US President George W. Bush or Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak–seems to have a clue as to what steps to take next.
So, what is Egypt likely to do in response to the crisis in Gaza? Some Egyptian steps are certain: Cairo will work behind the scenes to achieve a truce among the Palestinians in the hope that this will convince Israel to stand down from pursuing its counter-terrorism policy in Gaza. Egypt will also support a Saudi effort to revive the Mecca agreement, however difficult it will be to undo or at least cope with the fundamental changes on the ground since the Mecca agreement was reached. Less certain is whether Egypt will revitalize its own security efforts to stop weapons smuggling across the Egypt-Gaza border. The Egyptians may wait to see whether Palestinian militants act again in Sinai before awakening to the necessity of clamping down on smuggling of weapons.
These essentially short-term responses to the crisis in Gaza are probably all that we can expect from the Egyptians. While Cairo likes to believe that it has a more nuanced and deep understanding of what ails this region, under current circumstances such wisdom seems absent in every quarter. Daniel Kurtzer, a former US ambassador to Egypt and Israel, currently holds a chair in Middle East policy studies at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
