Pakistan is in the grip of a wave of vicious suicidal attacks after religious extremists vowed to avenge the operation on the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, in Islamabad last week. The suicide attacks on July 15 targeting security personnel, principally in the Frontier Province, left more than 45 dead and 100 injured. These attacks followed another suicide attack in Miramshah, North Waziristan, a day earlier when a suicide bomber targeted a military convoy and killed 24 paramilitary troops. This attack came just a day before the deadline issued by the local Taliban to break the peace agreement brokered with the government in September. The government had, in fact, decided to deploy two army divisions in the Waziristan area in anticipation of the trouble that erupted on July 14 and other transgressions by the local Taliban over the past few months. Security has particularly been beefed up in districts that provided sanctuaries for members of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), a banned jihadist terrorist organization with links to Al-Qaeda and the Red Mosque seminary. A red alert has been issued in the tribal areas in Waziristan and some volatile districts across the Frontier Province as the government braces for more trouble in the days ahead. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the government is prepared to face the backlash ensuing from the fallout of the operation in Islamabad. The harrowing events that followed the operation against the seminary in Islamabad could be better understood in the light of the following facts: First, there is a clear link between the Red Mosque and the JeM. A large number of male and female students at the seminary were from Matta and Khaza Khel in the Swat, Bajaur, Manshera and Dir districts, the principal areas inhabited by members and sympathizers of the JeM. Second, the resultant suicide attacks have been launched principally in the districts from where most of the members of the banned terrorist organization originated and have been provided sanctuaries by the locals. Besides, large-scale riots and protests by clerics sympathetic to JeM and the Red Mosque brigade have resulted in clashes with the security forces in several major cities and districts in the Frontier Province. Third, the Red Mosque hosted many foreign militants, including Uzbeks as well as Taliban from the tribal areas. It is widely known that Maulana Masood Azhar, a founding member of the JeM, had also visited the seminary in the past. It has also been brought to light, though inconclusively, that Al-Qaeda s number-two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had been in close contact with the seminary leaders, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Fourth, at the time of the operation, diehard militants belonging to the JeM as well as some Taliban and foreign militants remained until the end of the siege to fight against the government forces. The government has claimed that bodies of nearly a dozen foreign militants were recovered after the operation. Strong sympathy with the Taliban was evident in Ghazi s strong criticism of the government when it launched its operation against pro-Taliban militants in the tribal areas. Fifth, a large cache of weapons including AK47s, rocket propelled grenades, smoke, fire and splinter grenades, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, and other improvised explosive devises were discovered after the debacle. Besides two suicide bombers, who detonated themselves at the time of the operation, petrol bombs that had been prepared were also set off, resulting in the death of some women who had not left the premises. The seminary compound itself was discovered to be a maze of haphazard rooms and reinforced concrete underground bunkers, specifically designed for armed confrontations. Thus, a six-month standoff finally culminated in a week-long siege and armed confrontation, resulting in the deaths of at least 102 people, including soldiers and militants-students of the seminary. Unofficial estimates place the number of dead at several hundred. The operation was aimed at eradicating the increasingly emboldened and rabid jihadist seminarians, who posed a direct challenge to the state and enforced Islamic law. The government reached the end of its tether when it faced major diplomatic embarrassment after seven Chinese nationals were kidnapped on the grounds that they ran a massage parlor cum brothel. The government s apparent reluctance to launch the operation earlier could be better understood in light of its decision to minimize human losses, especially those of women and children. A decision to launch the operation on February 10 was postponed in view of estimates by Intelligence sources of the presence of 4,000-6,000 people, including a large number of women, in the compound. However, delaying action against the seminary as well as attempts to diffuse the situation though negotiations were taken as a sign of weakness by the extremists. As a result of this episode, Pakistan is at present in a precipitous position in the war in terror. Zawahiri has himself called for the elimination of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who has spearheaded the fight against Al-Qaeda and associated organizations and faced several assassination attempts in the process. Strangely, while Pakistan has commendably been pursuing the Al-Qaeda, it has been reluctant to address its issues of domestic extremism and the Taliban links. With the adoption of suicide attacks as the new strategic measure by terrorist organizations in South West Asia, the unfolding of events seems similar to Iraq. A tactic previously unheard of in Pakistan or Afghanistan has now assumed a cult following. In Afghanistan, the increasing use of suicide bombing is largely due to its effectiveness in redressing the strategic military imbalance in the war against foreign forces. The striking development in Matta on July 15 was the use of an explosive-laden car in order to cause maximum casualties and damage. The government is expected to implement further security measures in the troubled areas. Besides the deployment of additional security forces, it will have to reach an understanding with tribal elders and be clear in getting the message across. Harboring and supporting any anti-state elements, irrespective of ethnic or tribal affiliations, should not be tolerated. The urgent need is to set a precedent that would prove the state s policy to intolerance and take rapid action towards extremism. At this stage, it can be assumed that further escalation of terrorist tactics and reprisals by quasi-religious terrorist groups can be reined in with a strong commitment on part of the state. That includes solidarity on the political-military front and strong governance. Unfortunately, as in the Red Mosque case, negotiations and concessions only lead to the festering of the crisis to a point that results in the loss of many innocent lives.
Faryal Leghariis a researcher in the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with the center.
