One year has passed since the end of the Second Lebanon War. It is far too early to determine the long range effects and consequences of this war on Israel. Nevertheless, one year does give us a perspective from which we can derive some initial observations regarding the results of the war from the Israeli standpoint, both objectively and subjectively.
Any analysis of the war, as far as Israel is concerned, must indeed differentiate between the objective and subjective point of view. The subjective result of the war, i.e., the way Israelis view the war, is relatively easy to determine. As with beauty, victory or defeat is to a large degree in the eyes of the beholder and perceptions have a reality of their own. As will be demonstrated below, Israelis by and large were unhappy with the results of the war, although as time goes by this picture may be changing slightly.
At the same time, there is a need to assess the results of the war from an objective perspective. Such an assessment is far more difficult and will inevitably be a subject of contention and controversy. Although the conflict was clearly triggered by Hezbollah, it was Israel that decided to respond with a major military operation. It is therefore essential to understand what Israel s goals were in initiating such a major military action.
Israel s war goals are a subject of great controversy and debate in Israel. Many claim that Israel s political leadership never properly defined the political and military goals of the Second Lebanon War. Indeed, this conclusion is one of the most serious accusations made by the Winograd commission of inquiry. Others claim that the major failure of the Israeli government was that it formulated and presented to the Israeli public totally unrealistic goals for the war, such as the return of the kidnapped soldiers or the destruction of Hezbollah.
An examination of some of the statements made by Israel s leaders, and specifically those made by the prime minister and minister of defense, give credence to the latter claim. Indeed, PM Ehud Olmert, in his testimony before the Winograd commission, said that sometimes a leader must publicly espouse certain goals even though they are unattainable.
Be that as it may, what were the realistic goals for Israel s military action and to what degree were these goals achieved? In retrospect, one can identify two clearly defined goals, the achievement of which was the raison d etre from Israel s standpoint for the Second Lebanon War. The first goal was to restore Israel s deterrent–a capability seriously eroded as a result of Israel s ineffectual response to Hezbollah s provocations over the years as well as to the abduction, a few weeks earlier, of an Israeli soldier by Hamas near the Gaza border. While it would be almost impossible to retrieve the kidnapped soldiers by purely military means, the aim of Israel s military action was to prevent further abductions of Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. The second and essentially major goal was to bring about a basic change in the situation in southern Lebanon through implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and the removal of Hezbollah s provocative and threatening armed presence on Israel s northern border.
Based on the events of the past year and looking at the situation on the ground as of now, one can conclude objectively that these goals were to a large degree achieved. The very fact that Israel initiated large scale hostilities and in effect went to war in response to Hezbollah s provocation in and of itself went a long way toward restoring Israel s deterrence capability. At the same time, the far from conclusive result of the war and the Israeli public s widespread dissatisfaction and disappointment with its outcome impaired Israel s deterrent. Nevertheless, the grave Syrian concern about a possible Israeli attack and the fact that Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah emphasizes repeatedly that he has no intention of causing a renewal of hostilities with Israel do seem to indicate that Israel projects a renewed deterrence posture.
Accordingly, the probability of another attempt by Hezbollah to abduct Israeli soldiers or, indeed, of any incursion into sovereign Israeli territory in the near future is close to zero. Next time, Nasrallah won t be able to claim he never imagined Israel would respond so violently.
The major achievement of the war from Israel s point of view is no doubt the dramatic change in the situation on the ground in southern Lebanon and along Israel s northern border. For the first time in over 30 years, the Lebanese army has been deployed in southern Lebanon and has taken up positions along Israel s northern border. The introduction of thousands of armed UNIFIL troops, including sizable contingents from western European countries–France, Italy and Spain–does seem to be making a difference. Armed Hezbollah soldiers are nowhere to be seen along Israel s border. The quiet and tranquility, concomitant with the increased sense of security and the tourist boom this summer throughout the Galilee, attest to this dramatic change and can be seen as a positive result of the war.
From the subjective point of view, the story is quite different and far less positive. In a study performed by INSS in March 2007, the Jewish public expressed mixed feelings regarding the results of the Second Lebanon War. Fifty-one percent believed that neither side won the war; the remainder was evenly divided, with 23 percent saying that Israel won and 26 percent that Hezbollah won. At the same time, it should be noted that close to 70 percent justified the government s decision to go to war, although the vast majority believed that Israel should have continued the war until either Hezbollah was destroyed or the abducted soldiers recovered.
Faith in the political leadership was seriously diminished as a result of the outcome of the war. However, confidence in the Israel Defense Forces remained high, with 83 percent saying that they can depend on the IDF to defend the country.
Only time will tell to what extent the objective and subjective points of view converge.
Dr. Yehuda Ben Meir, a former deputy foreign minister of Israel, is currently a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org
