A few days ago an independent newspaper published an article about a group of young Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members’ plans to split from the organization and form their own, parallel supreme guidance office.
Despite its superficiality, the story pointed to the rising tempo of a generational conflict within the group. It also poses questions about the group’s ability to deal constructively with such issues and how capable it is of responding to its own youth’s thoughts and ambitions.
The MB has been going through major transformations lately, which are evident in the way the group has approached Egypt’s changing political scene, with many members now becoming more involved in public life; or in the way they view the group and what it should become.
A clear impression of the solidity of the Brotherhood youth’s political vision requires a quick look at the various generations present within.
The first of the four generations existing now is that of the 1950s and 1960s, which experienced the clash between the Brotherhood and the Nasser regime. Now in their seventies and eighties, this generation is ideologically, politically and religiously conservative and thus finds it difficult to interact positively with the changing political scene.
Their main objective is to keep the group’s unity intact, even if the price is a stagnation of their political discourse. In turn they are more interested in proselytizing than in playing politics.
The second generation is that of the 1970s which returned to political life during the Sadat era. This generation marks the Brotherhood’s complete spilt from violent currents widespread in the early 1970s.
Aged between 50 and 60, they are pragmatic, realistic and highly professional in their political approach. They strongly seek immersing the MB into Egypt’s political equation. Essam El Erian, head of the Political Bureau and Saad El Katatny, leader of the MB’s parliamentary bloc, symbolize this generation.
The third generation emerged during the second wave of clashes between the MB and the Mubarak regime in the early 1990s. This era culminated with the 1995 military tribunals. Aged between 40 and 50, this group is loyal to the pioneers and can be considered conservative, both intellectually and religiously. They also dominate most of the MB’s administrative posts as heads of the group’s sub-districts nationwide.
The final generation is the one which has experienced the most recent political activity. It is also part of the rise to power of the MB in political life over the past three years.
Aged between 20 and 30, they are characterized by the fact that they grew up in big cities like Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura. They are also more open intellectually, mainly because they escaped the closed religious up-bringing to which the previous generation was subjected. This was probably a result of their predecessors’ preoccupation with political work as opposed to proselytizing in the past decade.
This generation of professionals possesses the skills necessary to make full use of the information revolution through the internet which has deepened their political vision. They are also inspired by other successful regional Islamist experiences like Morocco and Turkey, and perhaps Jordan, which makes them push for the construction of similar systems in Egypt. The Islamist bloggers are perhaps the most poignant examples of this generation.
They are, however, faced with a lot of challenges. For one, many of them suffer prejudice by the older leaders, who slammed the doors in the face of their calls for internal change. This has driven many of the youth to direct violent criticism against the group’s internal organizational structure.
They also suffer a sense of isolation and inability to immerse themselves into the group, not only because of the ideological and age gap dividing them from the elders, but because the latter have failed to absorb the youth’s ambitions, regarding their initiatives as juvenile antics not to be taken seriously.
Another challenge to this generation is the lack of dialogue within the group and the dominance of a culture of obedience and an inability to accommodate differences of opinion. This stagnation has led some to resort to other mediums, such as newspapers and blogs to express their ideas more boldly, and sometimes even aggressively.
If the Muslim Brotherhood group fails to respond seriously to the ideas and ambitions of this generation, giving them more power within the group’s organizational structure, it will become increasingly difficult to control their actions, leading to unnecessary embarrassment.
Khalil Al-Ananiis an expert on Political Islam and Deputy Editor of Al Siyassa Al Dawliya journal published by Al-Ahram Foundation.
