It seems that today Egypt is divided between two currents: One is bent on achieving economic prosperity through high growth rates to attract foreign investment. This current relentlessly imposes the necessary economic policies to reach that goal, regardless of ethical and social considerations.
The second current aspires for a democratic Egypt, where citizens enjoy true freedoms. They push for transparency, responsibility and accountability.
This current criticizes government policies for being antagonistic to society and impervious of citizens, and seeking only to reinforce the existing state of political domination and economic deprivation.
Both currents, however, seem to project a narrow, unrealistic perspective on Egypt’s future.
For the former current, led largely by the new guard inside the ruling National Democratic Party who are allied with businessmen, economic reform is more important than political reform. They believe this to the extent that some even regard increased political freedom as a threat to economic reform, since it could result in the popular rejection of economic policies that may cause social problems.
They thus insist on economic reform without seriously addressing its negative implications and social repercussions. Supporters of this camp even argue that society should pay the toll of this reform until equilibrium is achieved, and the fruit of economic transformation reaches everyone.
They also believe that improving the economy will, on the long run, lend political legitimacy to those responsible for it, hence ensuring they remain in power without needing to improve the political situation.
It seems that recent economic achievements support this view. The Egyptian economy’s growth rate went up to 7 percent, as opposed to 3.5 percent in 2004, and foreign investment closed at almost $11 billion during the past two years, a rate never achieved in the past half century.
Theoretically, this performance should have led to popular satisfaction with the government and should have boosted its legitimacy. Practically, however, the opposite is true: The levels of political and social discontent are rising, not only because very few have benefited from the fruits of the improving economy, but also because of the growing suppression of political freedom imposed by the state against all political and social forces.
On the other hand, the second current is so obstinately opposed to all government measures, it often seems to be on a mission to underestimate any achievement and is intent on looking at the ugly side of the picture.
Subscribers to these ideas believe that economic reform works only to the benefit of a small clique of businessmen with no effort to improve levels of transparency or accountability, judging by the numerous corruption cases that have exploded over the past 10 years.
The second current suffers a complete lack of confidence in both the regime and its government. The state’s oppression of all opposition – whether it stems from the judiciary, journalists, political parties, or the Muslim Brotherhood – feeds this mistrust, exaggerating the image of the state as being at war with everyone.
This widening gap between both currents proves that we are in dire need of a third, more centrist, bloc that would encourage the economic transformation necessary for Egypt’s future, but in parallel demand more political openness to guarantee citizens’ freedom to express themselves without fear and intimidation.
Khalil Al-Anani is an expert on Political Islam and Deputy Editor of Al Siyassa Al Dawliya journal published by Al-Ahram Foundation.
