Many Egyptians have a firm conviction that their country is moving towards change, regardless of the nature and content of this change, and that a bill is being paid to accomplish this change. Everyone, however, is dubious and befuddled about the proposed models for such a change.
Over the past four years four models for change have emerged. The first is the “unity of the masses which springs from a belief that social movements must spearhead the movement for change. The advocates of this model believe in a constructive interaction between the elite and the masses according to Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) theory on “organic intellectuals .
This model was reflected in the emergence of the “Egyptian Movement for Change – better known by its moniker Kefaya (enough). Despite the enormous uproar caused by the movement since its inception in August 2004, it has remained a visionary elitist movement that comprises a hybrid mix of the remnants of the leftist and Marxist trend and the leaders of the 1970s student movement.
Now Kefaya appears to be an anachronism amid a state of silence and indifference despite the availability of an atmosphere conducive to action.
This constitutes an amazing sociological paradox and raises questions about the “pattern preferred by Egyptians as a framework for change. Such a pattern is definitely not represented in Kefaya, which seems incapable of mobilizing a people suffering under the yoke of the shortage of basic needs (clean water, bread).
The second model is that of “institutional action under a political framework enjoying legitimacy, embodied primarily in a “political party seeking to lead a large segment of the masses craving for change and disgruntled at the power struggle between the ruling party and the Muslim Brotherhood.
This model came into being during the 2007 inauguration of the Democratic Front Party whose founders have sought to steer a “third path between the National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood.
A few months later the party was plagued with divisions – a characteristic of partisan life in Egypt. It is now facing a real crisis that could have ruined the party had it not been for the efforts of Osama El-Ghazali Harb to help the party out of its current crisis.
The third model is that of the “informed proletariat. It is a model that reflects an intellectual purity and a political innocence feeding on the legacy of the Egyptian leftists and seeking to create its own utopian model in a reality witnessing the highest degree of expediency and opportunism.
This model was manifested in the issuance of Al-Badeel newspaper whose chief editor is an icon of the Egyptian intelligentsia, Mohamed El-Sayed Said, who wagers that the Egyptian citizen will become the main player in changing the current political equation, following in the footstep of Latin America’s new leftists.
The fourth model is the “reform from within model – in other words, change must come from inside the regime itself. It is a model based on the historical and institutional dimension of the Egyptian state which enjoys a typical centrality that makes it a model for resistance to change from outside. The supporters of this model believe in the possibility of exerting a kind of flaccid influence on the state and its political system. They believe they can pass their ideas and visions through the ruling elite – through what we may metaphorically call “pleasant injection. They are betting on the new elite’s need to scientifically legitimize their political and economic orientation, which is being met with a growing popular rejection.
Perhaps the most prominent figure that adopts and seeks to consecrate this model is Abdel Moniem Said, director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, who now plays an influential role in interpreting, and perhaps theorizing about the orientations and policies of the new elite in his capacity as a member of the ruling party. He seems optimistic about what happened in other similar experiments, like Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.
The ideologues of those four models sought to work in accordance with Gramsci’s concept of the role of the organic intellectual in affecting change.
Each has drawn up a route for themselves, but none of them has succeeded, at least so far, in mobilizing public opinion in favor of their own legitimate project, giving the religious groups an opportunity to win over and mobilize society in favor of their “salvation model – but that’s another story.
Khalil Al-Anani is an expert on Political Islam and Deputy Editor of Al Siyassa Al Dawliya journal published by Al-Ahram Foundation.
