Egypt is boiling; this is the least one can say of the general conditions in Egypt. From Abu-Fana monastery, which witnessed violent clashes between Muslims and Copts less than two weeks ago, to Al-Borollos village in Kafr El-Sheikh governorate, which witnessed the most violent demonstration over bread, Egypt seemed stuck between completely frozen political reform and economic openness, which is not restricted by any regulations or limits.
The continual tension and violence between Muslims and Copts reveals the extent of sectarian tension in Egypt since the early seventies. I find no justification for this but the state’s failure to provide a calm atmosphere through genuine political reform that can absorb all forms of social and sectarian tensions.
The evidence for this is that during the first half of the twentieth century, i.e. until the July 1952 revolution, Egypt did not witness any sectarian tension. Rather, there was an exemplary case of coexistence between all Egyptians, not just facing the danger of foreign occupation, but because there was political liberalism open to all ideas and directions without restriction. Even during the era of late President Abdel-Nasser, Egypt did not witness any sectarian tension, as he was able to unify all people regardless of their religion or creed over one national project. He also mobilized everyone behind him, although there were no political parties or real channels for expression.
However, there is no real liberalism now, or even a national project that can gather people around it and mobilize them strongly so that everyone works to defend it and work for it. Moreover, the issue of the relationship between Copts and Muslims has been taken over by security agencies, which has added fuel to the fire.
Nearly 5,000 people demonstrated in Al-Borollos village and cut off the highway between Al-Arish and Marsa Matrouh in protest against the governor’s decision to stop selling flour to warehouses and ban flour distribution on ration cards. The security forces responded to the residents and citizens violently, with several people being beaten and wounded.
The problem of the Egyptian government is that it deals with such crises as mere emergencies, while they reflect, in essence, the bankruptcy of the regime and the National Democratic Party in running the political and economic affairs of the country. It is a bankruptcy that seems clear when all these files are assigned to security agencies to manage them rather than trying to find political solutions to handle the roots of the crises.
Egypt is in need of a structural change in the rules of governance so that the management of social and political relations becomes automatic and requires the state’s intervention only in extreme cases.
This requires changing the package of laws and regulations that stifle political life and lead to tension; especially the laws relating to the formation of parties, the exercise of political rights and the establishment of civil society organizations. Otherwise, these crises will continue more and will become more violent.
Khalil Al-Anani is an expert on Political Islam and is a Patkin Visiting Fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings Institution. E-mail: [email protected].
