European integration implies successive transfers of national sovereignty to the Union. But, while member states readily comply with decisions that abolish protective measures – say, import duties – they hesitate to formulate or advance policies that would grant the European Union discretionary powers to take initiatives. Typical examples of this are the stalled Lisbon Strategy, the incomplete Economic and Monetary Union, and now, following the Irish public’s blocking maneuver, the uncertain fate of the new EU Constitutional Treaty (the “Lisbon Treaty ).
A similar weakness is evident in the EU’s attempt to define itself in the global system. Energy security, climate change, the rise of China, and the revival of Russia are among the many issues that require effective responses. Often, however, the EU cannot respond or can do so only slowly, because its structure obstructs quick decisions and fast action. This structure was appropriate in an era when the free market was practically the only issue that the EU had to confront at the global level. But that era is over.
Change is rendered more difficult by the insufficient democratic legitimacy of EU bodies. The lack of a direct relationship with Europe’s people deprives these bodies of the pressure required to bring about rapid action and responsive policies.
There is no easy solution to these problems. Democracy in the EU cannot be guaranteed by the models and rules that apply in the member states. The scale of the problems makes more elaborate solutions necessary. When dealing with the EU, member states usually aim for arrangements and regulations that ensure cooperation within agreed-upon frameworks. And, as the Irish referendum showed, they do not readily accept unifying initiatives that would make the EU an autonomous center of power.
But, assuming that the obstacle thrown up by Ireland’s voters can be overcome, experience has shown that the EU’s future evolution will be marked by increasingly centralized power in Brussels and the retreat of individual states. The lever for this process will continue to be the EU’s central bureaucracy, the mechanism that formulates the member states’ common interests and whose field of action is determined by loose, and periodic, inter-governmental collaboration. The more responsibilities the Brussels bureaucracy acquires, the more independent it will become.
The prime concern for the EU bureaucracy is to find compromises that meet the wishes of member states, and to accommodate often divergent and contradictory national preferences. A common will usually emerges without any emphasis on conflicting political tendencies and ambitions. In fact, de-politicization is seen to be advisable because it allows for the easy achievement of balances.
Bolstering democracy, however, requires emphasizing the political dimension and public debate that is free and open to all. National forums must make it their concern to discuss common European issues, thereby ensuring information for all, transparency, control, and accountability. Instituting public debate on European policy throughout the Union will help clarify the aims of the unification project, make common interests apparent, and determine Europe’s institutional shape.
This is why the Lisbon Treaty is so important. The provisions in the chapter on democratic principles, which concern the EU’s institutions and procedural functions, lay the groundwork for a system that is more open to public debate on EU policies.
The Lisbon Treaty also succeeds in tackling another major weakness of the EU ¬- its ineffectiveness. By means of extensive reforms to the structure, operation, and decision-making processes of EU institutions, the treaty enhances their effectiveness and enables greater dynamism.
True, many ordinary Europeans do not think that Europe should play an important part in global developments. They believe that foreign policy should be handled by their national governments. This view is outdated. Even in bilateral or regional crises, viable solutions are possible only at the supranational level.
The Lisbon Treaty envisages the EU as a highly outward-looking entity on the international stage. But there are limits to what the EU can do, limits determined by the Union’s inter-governmental nature. Indeed, on crucial issues, it is the 27 members, not the Union, that will decide.
Internally, the treaty takes a big step toward creating a Europe of freedom, security, and justice. It both sets the normative framework for EU policy and establishes institutions and procedures for policies on border controls, asylum, reception of migrants, and cooperation between judicial and police authorities. Thus, it creates greater security for people in their everyday lives.
The treaty is less detailed in other areas, particularly in achieving an economic union equivalent to the currency union, because it was simply not possible to reach agreement. Nonetheless, the Lisbon Treaty paves the way for planning and implementing policies needed to tackle crucial contemporary challenges, such as climate change, energy, research, technology, and tourism.
Whatever Irish voters intended by rejecting the treaty, socio-economic change will continue to force the EU to seek new forms of organization, combining inter-governmental and federal approaches. For example, the need to adapt the operation of the European Central Bank to a policy of development for Europe, as laid out by the Ecofin Council, is already apparent. The EMU is evidence of that.
More generally, however the problem of the Irish referendum result is addressed, the EU will gradually acquire its definitive shape on the basis of the ongoing problems that it must address, because as the dimensions of these problems grow, their management will require solid and durable forms of cooperation.
Constantinos Simitis, a former prime minister of Greece, is a member of the Action Committee on European Democracy (ACED). This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences, (www.project-syndicate.org).
