There are radical changes in the relationship between the state and society in Egypt. These changes occurred in the historic equation that has governed the relationship between citizens and the government for long centuries based on the intimate relationship between the “sponsoring state and its “content citizens.
There is an attempt now to forcibly wean the two from each other. But such disengagement does not take into account the specificity of this relationship or the repercussions for breaking it up.
The current Egyptian scene is characterized by several key features, including the wide gulf between the state and society, or rather between the ruling elite and the masses.
This gap is illustrated in cases of social resentment that have recently developed into unprecedented tension. People lack confidence in the ability of state institutions to contain this tension.
Social resentment has increased against the backdrop of economic policies that were approved over the past four years. Although these policies appear to be sound and sometimes necessary, they lack two major components.
First, they do not cope with preventive social policies that could alleviate the viciousness of privatization and reduce the bill of merging into a global economy as a key objective for the transition towards a market economy.
Secondly, the policies have not been accompanied by any real political opening, depriving it of a base of popular support and creating a psychological barrier against its actions.
There is a general feeling that the price of this misleading economic growth had been paid in advance through the adoption of distorted policies that have widened the gap between rich and poor. The irony is that high rates of economic performance have been associated with clear weakness in the services provided by state institutions and the lack of openness and transparency in both government and private sectors, not vice versa.
The dominance of a few individuals over the decision-making process is also obvious. This is accompanied by almost a complete suppression of legitimate political activity along with a very limited measure of freedom in satellite and media spheres which some seek to suppress altogether.
The irony is that at a time when this new oligarchy was supposed to seek some legitimacy supporting its boldness to take economic decisions, some of its members deride the social resentment and show indifference to the successive crises that result from these decisions. The elite could have rebuilt the political arena in Egypt in parallel with its insistence on economic liberalization; however, it is surprising that some people are worried that such an equation would make the ruling party lose control.
Such belief seems to be naive not only because of the absence of a replacement, at least for now, that can truly compete with the ruling party but also because the failure to open the political sphere would foment rejection and indignation about the policies of the party itself.
The worse thing is that there is a fatal flaw in the system of social values and an absence of the criteria of right and wrong, which is one of the characteristics of communities facing the specter of moral and cultural disintegration where everything becomes confused and the individual becomes his own judge with no reliable point of reference.
Therefore, the problem is no longer in the moribund state institutions but rather in the infrastructure of Egyptian society.
The country is now at a crossroads and we are witnessing a transition. It was no longer a matter of one party but rather a general communal responsibility to get out of the bottleneck.
Will Egypt rebuild a society on genuine democratic foundations or are we going to witness further deterioration and backsliding?
Khalil Al-Ananiis an expert on Political Islam and is a Patkin Visiting Fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings Institution. E-mail: [email protected].
