LONDON: The war in Georgia has clearly exposed the security vacuum in the surrounding region, as well as a lot of raw nerves. Russia’s hasty decision to recognize the “independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a shot across the bow for every former Soviet country, and has intensified speculation about who might be “next – and how to prevent Russia from multiplying the supposed Kosovo “precedent in other ex-Soviet countries.
Having established itself as the main broker in the conflict, the European Union has many urgent priorities in Georgia itself. But it should also be thinking ahead about how it can demonstrate a stronger commitment to security, democracy, and prosperity in the European “neighborhood. The most effective way of dealing with a newly assertive Russia will be for Europe to issue a collective refusal to accept a bipolar Europe of distinct Russian and EU spheres of influence.
The place to start is Ukraine. Fortunately, the EU-Ukraine summit on September 9 in Evian, France, provides the perfect opportunity.
Many Ukrainians now hear domestic echoes of the lead-up to war in Georgia. Ukraine has its own potentially separatist region in Crimea, and the country’s Russian minority numbers some 8.3 million (the largest minority in Europe). Half of Ukraine’s population is Russian-speaking in various degrees. Although the Ukrainian constitution bans dual citizenship, the government has had to launch an inquiry into alleged covert Russian passport-holding in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. Ukrainians note that Russia justified its invasion of Georgia, as the Nazis justified their dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, as being necessary to “protect a minority to whom they had just given citizenship.
Russia has begun a war of words over Ukraine’s supply of arms to Georgia. And the conflict itself has shown that the Russian Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, can operate with impunity, whether Ukraine likes it or not.
Based on its analysis of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution as a foreign-backed “NGO revolution, Russia has also been quietly building its own network of Russia-friendly NGOs in Ukraine since 2004. Ukrainians also talk of an otkat ekonomiya (“kickback economy ), in which Russian money percolates throughout the Ukrainian elite.
The European Neighborhood Policy is worthy enough, but it does not address the pressing concerns about maintaining and securing Ukraine’s independence. Many member states will worry about leaping straight to the contentious issue of ultimate membership for Ukraine, but the EU already recognizes Ukraine’s theoretical right to join once it has met the Copenhagen criteria; and it cannot be beyond EU leaders’ verbal dexterity to play up the prospect. What Ukraine would value most is a real sense that it is being treated distinctly in its own right. The key words are “association and “partnership, in whatever order or combination.
The EU has more scope for short-term measures, and should develop a multi-dimensional solidarity strategy as a signal to both Ukraine and Russia. For example, the EU’s foreign ministers should invite their Ukrainian counterpart to give a briefing on Ukraine-Russia relations at their next meeting. Ukraine should be offered a road map for visa-free travel. The new EU-Ukraine agreement should include a beefed-up solidarity clause, building on the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the EU would consult and assist Ukraine in case of challenges to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. And the EU should back Ukraine if it insists that the Russian Black Sea Fleet leaves on schedule in 2017.
The EU should also launch a comprehensive study of all aspects of Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies, including transit, energy security and conservation, supply diversification, and the impact of “bypass pipelines like Nord Stream and South Stream. It should consider linking the opening of the Nord Stream pipeline, which would allow Russia to cut off gas to Poland and Ukraine while maintaining deliveries to Germany, to the opening of the proposed “White Stream pipeline to bring gas from Azerbaijan directly to Ukraine via Georgia, bypassing Russia.
The EU could even play a part in keeping the 2012 European Championship football finals on track. The decision to appoint Ukraine and Poland as co-hosts was a powerful symbol of European unity across the current EU border (Poland is a member, Ukraine is not). UEFA is unhappy with Ukraine’s progress in building the necessary infrastructure, but Ukraine should be given time to get its act together.
Where appropriate, the EU should extend these measures to Moldova, which is now calling Ukraine a “strategic shelter.
Ukraine faces a crucial presidential election in 2009 or 2010 (and Moldova will hold elections in March 2009). After getting its fingers badly burned at the last election in 2004, Russia is clearly tempted to intervene again. The “Russian factor will strongly influence the campaign. Greater Western engagement is needed to ensure that the “Europe factor is equally prominent.
Andrew Wilsonis a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. This commentary in published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate/European Council on Foreign Relations (www.project-syndicate.org).
