CAIRO: The blast in Al-Hussein on Sunday indicates the fragile security situation in Egypt and shows how easy it has become to commit acts of violence.
The Al-Hussein blast bears a striking similarity to the April 7, 2005 suicide bombing carried out by Hassan Bashandi when he blew himself up amid a group of foreign tourists, killing three and wounding 11.
The common factor is not only the choice of the targeted area, but also the tools that were used in both bombings: a homemade explosive device that can be easily assembled through readily available online instructions. The second point we should be aware of is the participation of women in the bombing, as according to initial security accounts two people donning the niqab (full face veil) who are likely to be women, took part in the bombing.
The same thing happened on April 30, 2005 when two women opened fire on a tourist bus in Old Cairo’s Al-Sayeda Aisha district before committing suicide.
It seems we are witnessing a new type of terrorism that can best be described as “random individual terrorism. It is a pattern indicating the absence of a large organization taking responsibility for these operations.
Instead, small extremist cells made up of four or five members sharing a violent ideology and seeking to implement it on the ground could be behind the attacks, making it very difficult for security bodies to track them down.
But the question is: who is behind the Al-Hussein bombing? There can be several explanations: First there has been a large increase in Salafist discourse in Egyptian society over the past three years. I have repeatedly warned of the possibility of a change of thought among the Egyptian Salafist trend, which opts for violence.
It is true that the Salafist movement is not interested in politics, but at a certain point, some of its members may show a desire to express their ideas in a violent way, as was the case in Taba, Dahab and Sharm El-Sheikh which were the target of terrorist bombings between 2004 and 2006. Small fundamentalist groups claimed responsibility for them.
Second, regional tensions, especially after the war on Gaza, and the political ascendancy of the conservative Israeli right, as well as deep Arab division, fan feelings of violence and the radical ideology of some small religious groups who seek revenge on behalf of the Palestinians.
Third, some new jihadists are bent on embarrassing and retaliating against the Egyptian regime as punishment for its regional policies especially during the war on Gaza. Targeting tourism, which is a major source of national income, could be part of this vengeance.
Finally, the bombings may be in response to international attitudes in favor of Israel, and thus increasing the anger of many categories within the Egyptian society, especially the marginalized and the underprivileged.
Finally, there could be a relationship between Al-Hussein bombing and some of the recently-released suspects who were arrested in connection with the 2005 Khan El-Khalili bombing. They could be trying to retaliate for those who received life sentences or were killed during the operation.
We should also take note that the impact of ideological reviews shunning violence made by the Islamic Group and Al-Jihad Group is still limited, and that it is difficult to count on them alone to stem violence in Egypt.
Khalil Al-Anani is an Egyptian expert on political Islam and democratization in the Middle East and is a senior fellow at Al-Ahram Foundation. E-mail: [email protected].
