WASHINGTON, DC: Perhaps never in history have nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control received the prominence that they will during this month’s strategic trifecta: the April 6 release of the latest United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the April 8 signing in Prague of the New START Treaty, and the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit. These events will flow into May’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
US President Barack Obama has become one of the most prominent global advocates of abolishing nuclear weapons, a position for which he unexpectedly received a Noble Peace Prize last year. But Obama’s actions have been considerably more restrained than is often assumed.
In general, Obama has pursued a policy of nuclear balance in which steps towards disarmament are accompanied by measures to retain America’s nuclear primacy. The former underscore his administration’s commitment to meeting its obligations under the NPT, while the latter reassure the US Congress and allies skeptical of bold new approaches.
The administration’s policies strive to address the aspirations of global disarmament advocates in several ways. The NPR, for example, further reduces America’s reliance on nuclear weapons by adopting an almost no-first-use doctrine. Only in “extreme circumstances would the US consider using nuclear weapons. For the first time, the US pledges not to retaliate with a nuclear strike even if attacked by chemical or biological weapons.
The NPR also commits the US not to develop new nuclear weapons, missions, or capabilities. Obama’s administration will instead continue to enhance the roles and capabilities of US conventional forces to perform missions previously assigned to nuclear weapons. In addition, his administration pledges not to resume testing nuclear weapons by detonating them, and to seek to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force by securing its ratification by the US Senate and all other countries. Symbolic of the administration’s commitment to transparency and openness, the Obama NPR is the first such document to be entirely unclassified.
In describing the New START Treaty, Obama administration officials stress the magnitude of the reductions. The number of permissible deployed warheads, 1,550, is 74 percent lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30 percent below the cap set by the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The limit for strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles is less than half that of the original START Treaty. The administration describes these lower ceilings, and its pursuit of other arms control measures, as meeting America’s non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under the NPT.
Nevertheless, the administration has sought to meet the concerns of those Americans and US allies worried that Obama might pursue a naïve and reckless path toward nuclear disarmament. Although Obama has endorsed the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, he has described this as a long-term effort, and offered no concrete time-line for achieving it. No date has been set when Obama will ask the Senate to reconsider the CTBT.
Whereas advocates of abolishing nuclear weapons wanted his administration to employ a zero-based approach to nuclear planning, with the burden of proof on those seeking to retain nuclear weapons to fulfill essential military functions, the NPR presumes the continuation of current nuclear roles and missions unless convincing arguments exist to end them. It presumes that “the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.as long as nuclear weapons exist.
The NPR affirms the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, under which the US retains the option to employ nuclear weapons to defend its allies. Skeptics doubt the credibility of this policy, which in principle obliges the US to sacrifice New York in response to an attack on Warsaw, or endanger Los Angeles to defend Taipei.
But proponents of such US guarantees believe that they discourage aggression and contribute to nuclear non-proliferation by reducing the incentive of US allies to seek their own nuclear deterrents. In this context, the administration has rejected calls to withdraw US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe unilaterally, insisting that it will only do so with the consent of all NATO members.
Moreover, the no-first-use pledge in the NPR contains an important hedge. It commits the US not to employ or threaten to employ nuclear weapons against states that do not possess them, provided that these countries remain in compliance with the NPT and their other nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The Obama administration considers both Iran and North Korea to be outside this category.
American START negotiators argued with their Russian colleagues for months to exclude legally binding language that might constrain missile defenses or the use of non-nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. Although some US officials remain skeptical about these capabilities, they appreciate that Congress might not ratify a START Treaty that included formal limitations on these options.
Even with the lower ceilings found in the New START Treaty, the US will maintain thousands of nuclear weapons, as well as the long-standing US “strategic triad of intercontinental land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable bombers. Having this mixture helps ensure that if technological developments render one leg vulnerable, the others can still threaten sufficient retaliation. The US will seek to guarantee the reliability of its nuclear weapons by spending billions of dollars to improve its nuclear weapons infrastructure and conduct tests not involving nuclear detonations.
The Nuclear Security Summit plays an essential role in linking both strands of Obama’s nuclear policies. American liberals and conservatives, as well as US friends and allies, all favor the principle of enhancing the security of dangerous nuclear materials and reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, which could plausibly threaten anyone.
Obama has introduced important innovations in US nuclear policy, but much important continuity with previous policies exist. Given the stakes, continuing to rely on proven approaches, even while trying to promote a world with fewer and safer nuclear weapons, is a judicious strategy.
Richard Weitzis Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).
