BAGHDAD: In spite of July temperatures in Baghdad that exceed 50 centigrade and are exacerbated by a severe lack of electricity, the daily topic of conversation among Iraqis is still the formation of the government and related issues. The controversial outcome of the 2010 Iraqi national elections and the ongoing slow government formation process — what some call a political crisis — have been dominating the headlines since the March 7 election day.
July 14 was the constitutional deadline for parliament to convene and elect its leaders. This did not happen. The political blocs preferred to delay the meeting for two weeks, during which they hope to reach a deal on a package that includes the three top government positions: prime minister, president of the republic and speaker of the parliament. By doing this, they violated the constitution. But on the other hand, convening parliament without prior agreement on the aforementioned package would not be productive because no political party has close to the 163 seats that form the simple majority required to get any of these positions.
Many people blame the political parties for the delay, accusing them of preferring their own interests to those of the nation. Almost every party accuses others of favoring the positions and interests of some of the regional countries and thus blames them for the failure of the negotiations thus far. Although there is some truth in these accusations, there are also other, more complicated and more profound factors.
Iraq is undergoing fast and deep social, political and economic change. There is competition over the distribution or re-distribution of power among political entities: a struggle between the pre-2003 and post-2003 power holders, and competition among diverse post-2003 parties themselves. There are fears of losing power or of the abuse of power by others, and concern over the distribution of power and wealth among the central government, the Kurdistan region and the provinces, the disposition of disputed areas with the Kurds and relations with neighboring countries.
These struggles are often colored by sect and ethnic divides, and further complicated by a politics of fear that is driven by Iraq’s political history of oppression and cruelty, making compromise more difficult. The good thing, however, is that so far all the political parties are referring to the constitution and the courts in their disputes and not falling back on violence.
Given these complexities, there is no quick fix. Perhaps a new government will be formed in the next two months, but even then it will need another three or four months to begin functioning. The ministers will be from different parties with different interests and views and could lack experience. Moreover, the new government will face a tough agenda. At the top of the list are security and the US withdrawal from Iraq.
Both Iraqis and Americans agree that American forces will withdraw as determined by the security agreement between the two countries. By the end of August this year, combat forces will complete their withdrawal, leaving some 50,000 troops for non-combat missions, who will remain until 2011. In fact, the withdrawal operation of American combat forces has been ongoing for months. It meets Iraqi concerns about sovereignty, enhances the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and creates the right climate for Iraq to engage neighbors who assist militant groups. More importantly, it denies militant groups the capacity to exploit the occupation for self-promotion, thus isolating them from the public and providing the Iraqi government with a great advantage in its counter-insurgency efforts.
In addition, the improvement in Iraqi Security Forces capabilities is very real. Their daily activities demonstrate growing success in combat despite the 2009 budget crisis and the recent stagnation in the political process. The probability of a renewed insurgency is low: the ISF is too strong for the fragmented insurgents and Iraqis are too tired of war to support them.
Nonetheless, Iraq will require continued aid, particularly from the US, to develop its security forces to the point where they can effectively meet the internal and external security challenges that face the country. And Iraq needs civilian assistance. The Strategic Framework Agreement can be the outline for cementing an Iraq-US partnership that can profoundly alter relations between the West and Iraq and the region. After decades of brutal and oppressive tyranny and years of destructive conflict, the bottom line is that Iraq will survive this political crisis — one that we can alternatively term an alarmingly slow political process — and that it still has a chance to emerge as a stable, prosperous and leading country in the region.
Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council. This commentary is published by Daily News Egypt in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org.
