By Khalil Al-Anani
CAIRO: Whereas the number of Muslim Brotherhood members is still a big secret, it’s not difficult to determine its electorate.
Three categories of people tend to vote in favor of the Brotherhood (or the Ikhwan) candidates. First, there are those who are committed to Ikhwan’s religious and political ideology. They’ve been called “Ikhwan A’mlien,” those who pay membership subscription on regular basis. They participate in the elections not only to comply with the movement’s organizational mandate but also to fulfill their religious duty. Their number doesn’t exceed 50,000. However, they can mobilize fourfold their number at least.
Second come those who are not officially members in the MB but are sympathetic to its religious standing and benefit from the Ikhwan’s social subsidies. Their voting behavior is determined by the Ikhwan’s ability to mobilize and reward them during elections campaigns and afterwards.
Third are those who do not have specific political preferences, however are inclined to vote against the ruling National Democratic Party’s candidates. They are protest voters. They won’t certainly vote for the Ikhwan candidate, but they surely will vote for those who can buy their votes.
The MB targets the first and second categories. They exemplify the Ikwhan electorate. In the 2005 elections, the Ikhwan claimed acquiring 3 million votes roughly out of a turnout of 7 million. Two thirds, at least, came from the aforementioned two categories. Accordingly, each Ikhwan winning candidate (88 members) got approximately 35,000 votes. However, the Ikhwan had run a very successful elections campaign in 2005 which they cannot replicate in 2010.
In the upcoming elections, the MB has nominated 130 candidates, 100 of them will practically run as independent candidates. Regardless of the political repression against the Ikhwan candidates in many constituencies, the group will not be able to mobilize its regular electorate as it used to. “Bury your 2005 elections nostalgia” was the official message to the Ikhwan during the last few weeks. However, the group insists on participation regardless of its substance.
Apparently, the Ikhwan lacks the ability not only to mobilize sympathizers but also to convince its grassroots of the feasibility of participating in the elections. The MB could not evoke the 2005 elections’ tactics or succeed in having internal consensus over its participation decision in the 2010 elections.
The Ikhwan’s predicament in the upcoming elections will not be confined to its expected loss, but, and most importantly, to the negative effects on its image as a popular political force. This will be the jackpot for Mubarak’s regime.
Khalil Al-Anani is a PhD Candidate at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. He can be reached at: [email protected]
