By Joseph Bahout
When the Hariri government in Lebanon fell at the end of last year, and although a new prime minister was quite quickly appointed by the majority that coalesced around the March 8 forces, almost all analysts speculated that Lebanon was entering a long period of political vacuum and that the prime minister-designate would take a long time to form his government. The speculation then was that Syria and Hezbollah, the two main power brokers behind the maneuver, just wanted to get rid of outgoing Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s majority in order to deal from a more comfortable position with the anticipated Special Tribunal for Lebanon indictment regarding the assassination of Hariri’s father, Rafik, in 2005.
A lot of surprises followed, however, and provided additional explanations for the subsequent limbo period of five months during which prime minister-designate Najib Mikati seemed either unable or unwilling to form a cabinet. The “Arab spring” revolutions erupted, first not only ignoring Syria but ironically seeming to play to its advantage, then ultimately reaching its soil and spreading from the remote province of Deraa to the entire country. Syria’s initial unwillingness to shape the political landscape of its Lebanese backyard by pushing for formation of a cabinet morphed into an inability–a paralysis induced by the stunning way in which the Syrian uprising confronted the Damascus leadership.
This is why, when all of a sudden the March 8 forces finally ended their bickering around the quotas to share, the new team was announced two days after Walid Jumblatt’s visit to Syrian President Bashar Assad, the day after the decisive events in Jisr al-Shughur in northwest Syria, and on the day of the Turkish elections. True, there is a classic Lebanese reflex that reads all local details through the prism of regional affairs. But most analysts linked the sudden formation of a Lebanese cabinet to the Syrian turmoil.
In explaining the haste and speed with which this government was eventually formed, the Syrian parameter is indeed more than central and the Syrian context predominant. After having ousted Saad Hariri and neutralized him in anticipation of the conclusions of the tribunal, and having tilted the Lebanese political balance of power by pushing the Jumblatt bloc towards March 8, Syria–now facing an existential battle inside its system and territory — was badly in need of a secure Lebanese neighbor along with additional tools for confronting one of the most acute crises of the Assad era. Confronted with Arab ignorance, Turkish defiance and growing isolation and threats by the West, Damascus’ message was “Lebanon is, despite all this, still ours.”
This was meant both as a message that Syria’s capacity to generate movement outside its frontiers — today in Lebanon and tomorrow in Iraq — was intact, and to signify that Lebanon could now be added by Syria’s antagonists as yet another theater of confrontation with Damascus. Syria was in fact sending a message very similar to the one sent in September 2004–the forcible extension of President Emile Lahoud’s mandate — to the international community, and specifically to France and the United States that sought to encircle Syria with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559. Hezbollah was then a crucial and effective ally and enforcer. The latest message aims to inform the entire world that is pressuring Assad that the alliance with Iran is, despite troubled times, stronger than ever and effective enough to produce a political reality in Beirut.
Still, despite the overwhelming Syrian parameter, internal Lebanese considerations also have to be factored into any explanation of the sudden government formation. These are mainly related to Hezbollah, which once again helped its Christian ally Michel Aoun grab the lion’s share in the new coalition, including strategic portfolios essential to the mission of cleansing the civil and security administration of residual pro-Hariri personnel.
Then, too, we need to comprehend an interesting sign of Shiite tactical political flexibility: the “gift” made by the Amal-Hezbollah tandem to the Sunnis, who received one more portfolio than traditionally permitted under Lebanese custom, and at the expense of the Shiite share. By offering this concession, the allies of Damascus and Tehran were of course showing sectarian “generosity” and openness. But were they not also helping Damascus send a signal that its Lebanese — hence, Syrian — policies are not anti-Sunni in essence?
All this leads to the crucial question looming today in Lebanon in light of the Syrian quagmire. If the Syrian regime gets weaker, will Hezbollah gradually become more flexible in terms of Lebanonization and civilianization? Or, on the contrary, will it increasingly pursue a radical position and bitterly defend its share of the Lebanese system while echoing Tehran’s dictum that Assad’s rule in Syria is a red line?
Joseph Bahout is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and researcher at Academie Diplomatique Internationale. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org.
