By Khalil Al-Anani
Despite its stunning victory in the recent parliamentary elections, the image of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) among revolutionary Egyptians has been badly shaken. The recent clashes between the movement’s youth, who went to Tahrir Square to celebrate the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and the revolutionary activists, who were there to protest against military rule, reveals the widening gap between both groups.
However, the problem is not that the MB is less “revolutionary” than other parties but rather because it simply cannot be.
Since its inception some eight decades ago, the MB avoided revolution or comprehensive change and embraced a gradual, even sluggish, reform strategy. Hassan Al-Banna, the founder and ideologue of the MB, abandoned the word “revolution” in all his tracts instead advocating reform (Islah). More importantly, the social construction of the movement’s members disavows radical change for the sake of gradual reform. The recruitment and socialization (tarbiyya) process, which every active member of the MB has to undergo, advocates steady and incremental reform of the self, society, and the state. Hence concepts like confrontation and clash are alien to the MB’s leaders and cadres. The “bottom-up” approach espoused by the MB for decades and entrenched in its social presence, has nevertheless aborted its boldness and confidence in facing the Egyptian state.
Indeed, the heavy legacy of repression and exclusion under the Mubarak regime has turned the MB into an over-cautious and obsessive organization. While the movement seeks to overcome this legacy, it seems unable to make a full rupture with its deeply embedded past. True, the movement has supported the revolution since its outset; but it never sought to initiate it or to end Mubarak’s regime through mass protests. The result of such a thinking pattern was that accommodation not confrontation has become a key strategy for the MB in dealing with those in power.
However, in revolutionary moments such as the one Egypt is currently undergoing, this strategy appears pointless and may even backfire on the MB and erode its long-standing popularity.
Paradoxically, despite the outright majority attained by its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the MB is still thinking and acting as an opposition movement rather than a responsible power holder. It seems reluctant to take full power over the country, or as Nathan Brown aptly puts it, “the MB confronts its success.” Hence the MB’s leaders are grappling with making the shift from long-standing repressed mentalities to those of statesmen, or as one of the MB defectors has told me “they need psychological rehabilitation” before ruling the country.
However, the question is not how the MB leaders will rule the country but rather how will they legitimize and justify their power. The response of the MB leadership in disputes with other forces provides a gloomy pattern. Strikingly, the statement the movement issued on the Tahrir Square quarrel alarmed those who might disagree with its political stance. Whereas the movement should have apologized for its stark blunders over the past few months (e.g. their stance on the deadly clashes of Mohamed Mahmoud Street in November, condemning Tahrir protesters during the cabinet building clashes, frequently granting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) legal and political immunity) it defied the mounting calls for an immediate transfer of power from the military to a civilian president. Ironically, the MB’s newly-issued newspaper “Al-Hurriyya Wal Adala” reiterated the rhetoric of notorious public newspapers toward Tahrir protesters when it dubbed them “anarchists [who] seek to destabilize the country.”
The conformity between the MB and SCAF in dealing with the revolution comes as no surprise due to their mutual interests. The MB seeks to consolidate the extraordinary gains it attained since Mubarak’s ouster without risking its internal coherence. And the junta wants to maintain their extraordinary privileges without any civilian oversight. Clearly, both are exemplifying an obsolete mindset. They promote “reform” over “revolution,” “stability” over “change,” and “procedural” over “genuine” democracy. Not surprisingly, they are involved in negotiating, compromising, and brokering the future of the country behind the scenes.
Nevertheless, the hoary leadership pattern of the MB impedes its attempt to replace Mubarak’s regime and to act as a ruling power. The MB needs not only to reshape and normalize its relationship with the state, society, and other political forces after decades of differentiation and to operate as a “normal” political movement not as a sub-state actor, but more importantly to restructure its internal organization to fit in with the new political environment in Egypt.
Besides its controversial relationship with the FJP (which will likely discredit the party at some point), the MB’s internal structure suffers from inertia. There are ample manifestations of this. For instance, it was expected after the revolution that the MB would rebuild its main structures (e.g. The Guidance Bureau (maktab alirshad al’am), the General Shoura Council (majlis al-Shura al’am), and Administrative Bureaus (al-makatib al-idariyya), to be based on more democratic and representative procedures. However, the movement maintained these structures and marginalized those who were appealing for change.
Not surprisingly, many of the MB’s young activists are increasingly disenchanted and dissatisfied with the movement’s stagnation and the unwise political behavior of its leaders. As one of the young Brothers recently told me “the revolution has not yet shattered the movement’s old narratives.”
Ironically, even after the removal of the brutal surveillance systems and the dissolution of the State Security Apparatus, the MB still practices its habitual secrecy in running internal activities. The weekly and bio-monthly meetings of its micro-units, the Family (al-usra) and the Branch (sho’aba), are convened clandestinely.
The FJP, so far, resembles its patron. It inherited the MB’s organizational and political tactics. The way the party has selected its Secretary General, Saad El-Katatni, to become the parliament speaker provides a striking example.
Up until now, neither the MB’s grassroots nor the public knows how El-Katatni was chosen, who nominated him, and how and when the selection process took place. The party did not issue a clear statement in this regard and none of its members asked. Unlike their Moroccan counterparts in the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), who held internal elections for governmental positions, the FJP is inclined to replicate the MB’s pattern in appointing positions lacking in transparency and accountability.
Thus, the underlying factor behind the party’s sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections should be attributed not to its revolutionary platform or liberal credentials but mainly because of the social reservoir of its patron, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Therefore, for Egypt to proceed towards a viable democracy, its new leading power (the MB) need to be “revolutionized,” otherwise nothing will change. Old habits die hard!
Khalil Al-Anani is a Scholar at the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University and former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute. He can be reached at: [email protected] This article is printed with permission from its author. It was first published by Foreign Policy magazine.
