Over the years, the United States has changed its strategy in the Middle East.
In 2020, the United States announced a plan for a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan by September 2021. In August 2021, a major withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan took place, within the framework of the agreement between the United States and the Taliban. Indeed, a large and rapid withdrawal of American and allied forces took place.
As for the rest of the Middle East, there are no strong indications of a complete US withdrawal from the region. Washington still has strategic and economic interests in the Middle East, such as regional security, political stability, and energy.
The US foreign policy changes based on new challenges and priorities, and may also be affected by political and security developments in the region. For example, when the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia was announced, which was mediated by China, in March 2023, a crisis occurred within the current US administration. This is because this agreement marked Beijing’s entry into the arena of power politics in the Middle East.
Although the Biden administration denied the role of Chinese mediation in concluding the agreement that revived diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, this denial is evidence of a decline in American influence. This is as Washington’s actions since then confirm its concern about the growing Chinese influence in the Middle East.
Over the past few months, the United States has deployed additional military elements to the region and increased joint patrols and exercises around the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has also warned that it will enhance arms deals with regional partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and confirmed that it will expand training operations with Egypt, Kuwait, and others. All of this is in a clear effort to reassure Arab partners of its commitment to the security of the Middle East.
But these moves are unlikely to enhance American influence. This is because the turn of the Arab powers towards Beijing is not the result of the weakness of the US military presence in the region. Those countries are well aware of the size of US military investments in the Middle East, but they are skeptical about the US will to use these capabilities to serve the interests of Arab countries. So, they cooperate with China in areas such as infrastructure and technology when it seems to them that the United States is less able or willing to help them.
In fact, these countries prefer China to the United States because they seek to acquire some military systems, such as advanced drones, a weapon that the United States has kept out of their reach. Chinese foreign policy also tends to be friendlier to its counterpart regimes. That’s because Beijing works to keep its distance from rival powers in the region, presenting itself as an unbiased mediator.
In light of this new direction, the United States needs a new approach to the region. It must accept the more positive aspects of China’s growing presence in the Middle East, and encourage Beijing’s contributions to regional development and stability, rather than containing them. At the same time, Washington must respond to Chinese actions that harm US interests with precise measures.
Also, Washington should not insist on its outdated strategy that emphasizes security, and do its best to create defense blocs loyal to the United States with the aim of creating a force to counter Chinese encroachments.
Contrary to this policy, the United States should include its political tools and investments in the region in areas in which it excels, such as human capital development, education, green technology, and digital platforms.
Over the past decade, the foreign policies of many countries in the Middle East have shifted towards a multiplicity of alliances. Traditional U.S. partners, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have reservations about Washington’s attempts to establish exclusive loyalties in their leadership. So they are seeking partnerships with multiple powers, including China, India, Russia, and the United States.
The United Arab Emirates is an example. Although Abu Dhabi is still a close security and economic partner of the United States, it has strengthened its relations with Beijing through trade, technology exchange, and new arms deals, and maintained its diplomatic and economic relations with Russia, despite Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The UAE is also investing, In trade and technology initiatives with India, under the ratification of the new Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2022.
Thus, given that other Middle Eastern countries are also seeking similar diverse partnerships, the trend towards multiple alliances is likely to result in the renewal of US influence policies in the region.
Although the Middle East is multi-alliance, it is not multi-polar. The United States remains the primary security sponsor for the Middle East, and it seems unlikely that this position will be exposed to any danger in the foreseeable future. Although the total number of US forces has decreased from its peak, it still exceeds 30,000. Almost as it was before the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.
But dominance does not mean exclusivity. Despite China’s modest security role in the region, it may guarantee its partners’ defence and economic opportunities that the United States does not provide. For example, Beijing has only one military base, located in Djibouti, but it has invested in the ports of the entire region, and they can be used for both civilian and military activities.
This strategy helped China expand its military reach and boost its trade with Middle Eastern countries at the same time. The United Arab Emirates allowed China, as a US intelligence report noted in December 2022, to resume construction on a military logistics facility at one of these ports. This measure is not intended to replace the major military role of the United States in the country, but rather to enable China to expand its military presence there.
On the other hand, the regional powers appreciate the Chinese offer as a complement to the US weapons systems that those countries continue to buy and prefer due to their high quality, and they do not dispense with them. China has also provided Arab governments with assistance in the field of internal security, including training in law enforcement, and mastering advanced surveillance technologies. Therefore, from now on, Washington should not insist on its outdated security-focused strategy.
In order to avoid being marginalised, the United States should realise that the main threats facing the Middle East are social and economic problems, not power conflicts.
Dr. Hatem Sadek: Professor at Helwan University
