The killing of Yahya Sinwar, the head of the political bureau of Hamas, could serve as a significant justification for closing the chapter on the war in Gaza, which has ignited the entire region. In reality, there are no longer strong leaders within Hamas capable of advancing negotiations, whether regarding Israeli hostages or even a ceasefire. In any case, we are faced with a completely new and different scenario.
This assassination may also embolden Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to pursue all his ambitions, whether by leveraging this achievement to bolster his domestic standing or by addressing external challenges, such as dismantling what is referred to as the unity of fronts (Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen). Additionally, it could facilitate efforts to eliminate the Iranian threat in accordance with Israeli interests.
The recent elimination of Al-Sinwar marks the final figure to be removed from those responsible for the events of October 7, following Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, and Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau. This action has also affected many of the first and second-tier leaders within both Hamas and Hezbollah. Undoubtedly, the removal of these individuals will lead to a transformation like alliances and the political landscape in Lebanon and Gaza. Netanyahu’s success in targeting these leaders enhances his confidence in his previous stances and obstinacy. Consequently, all eyes are now on his next move.
In any case, the prevailing belief is that Netanyahu will proceed with his plan, despite the potential for the elimination of Sinwar to create conditions conducive to a significant deal for the release of hostages and the re-establishment of the Palestinian Authority’s role in the Gaza Strip. However, he is unlikely to do so for several reasons, the most important being the urgency of time-related to the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. Before November 5, there must be an attack on Iran and a substantial destruction of the majority of Hezbollah’s infrastructure that has been built over the past 18 years, as well as the neutralization of any remaining Hamas capabilities that could threaten the Gaza border settlements. Netanyahu has successfully mitigated the pressure from Washington more than anticipated, allowing him the freedom to act solely according to his judgment regarding his “enemies.” This was evident in the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and, prior to that, Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Therefore, there is currently no time to discuss a ceasefire or de-escalation.
Internally, there is always a challenge in comprehending Israel’s complex policies, which are characterized by fluctuations and sharp turns rooted in the ongoing conflict between religious and political factions, both of which are united by extremism. This conflict itself continues to ignite the entire region, particularly since the events of October 7, 2023, fueled by illusions of power that are believed to bring security and stability.
The reality is that the extremist political and religious factions in Israel do not represent a minority; rather, they embody a culture that has been adhered to by Israeli political decision-makers since the establishment of the state in 1947. They recognized that without conflict, military and economic aid would not flow to the Jewish state. Consequently, for them, conflict and war are seen as the essential means of survival and control.
The intensity of extremism increased following the assassination of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. We have observed the rise of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who unexpectedly surpassed Shimon Peres, the leader of the Labor Party, in the 1996 elections. Since that time, it seems as though something has profoundly affected the political system. Interestingly, despite the catastrophic events and repercussions that have unfolded in Israeli society since last October, Netanyahu’s continued presence in power represents a significant paradox in current Israeli politics.
The key to understanding Netanyahu’s political puzzle lies in the new configuration of internal forces that has enabled him to govern the country comfortably while making foreign policy missteps without facing electoral repercussions. Currently, Netanyahu relies on a conservative coalition that encompasses three main factions: the Israeli national right, its far-right segment, and a more moderate right. The first two groups have long been integral to Israel’s political landscape. However, the emergence of the moderate right is noteworthy; this new faction can accurately be described as “soft or moderate right,” as the ultra-Orthodox have a distinctly more accommodating right-wing stance compared to the traditional Likud position. The moderate right is a loose coalition comprising three primary components: Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, Sephardic ultra-Orthodox, and secular immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Collectively, the parties of the moderate right hold 21 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which provides a comfortable margin to advocate for and pass legislation supporting the Jewish character of the state.
The focus of our discussion here is the flexible right that has gained prominence in the political arena since the 1996 elections. This faction represents the most aggressive stance against anything Arab, and it was the youth of this group who supported Netanyahu during those elections. This generation of activists, now in their late forties and early fifties, is gradually dominating the political agenda of their movements and has garnered increasing public support. Remarkably, they have managed to influence their senior rabbis to align with their political leadership. As these activists have shifted from the centre to the right, a significant number of hardline and conservative voters have followed suit. The flexible right activists can reach between 15-20% of the Israeli electorate, although they do not exert complete control over it. Groups associated with the flexible religious right include the youth from Agudat Yisrael, Degel HaTorah, the Chabad-Lubavitch movement, Shas, and several Sephardic rabbis.
The most significant aspect is that the new electoral system has empowered the flexible right by compelling the ultra-Orthodox rabbis who oppose Zionism to choose between two Zionist candidates for the position of Prime Minister, a scenario that was previously unimaginable. Two decades ago, the increasing appeal of the right among their young activists positioned Netanyahu as the uncontested candidate for all the ultra-Orthodox rabbis. Ironically, Netanyahu’s victory—an election of a Prime Minister who is not religiously observant and has admitted to infidelity—has, paradoxically, become their triumph. With the endorsement of their respected rabbis, the flexible right activists have emerged as a winning card for the Likud party.
The Prime Minister remains grateful for the flexible right-wing support that has provided him with votes; however, he quickly recognized the low cost of this ongoing backing. Netanyahu, who possesses excellent communication skills, understands that this emotionally charged electoral base is captivated by nationalist rhetoric and attacks on what they term “Arab terrorism.” Whenever a crisis erupts involving Palestinians, Hezbollah, or alleged “Arab sympathizers,” Netanyahu, the warrior, rushes to the cameras. The remarkable success of this media strategy became evident following the October 7 attack, as it not only unified the ranks in Israel but also attracted the largest naval fleets in the world to the shores of Gaza in support of his military efforts. Thus, it is not surprising that Netanyahu’s support within Israel increases whenever he launches an attack on Lebanon or Iran.
It is important to note that the flexible right is not only right-leaning but also adaptable. This implies a weaker commitment to the fundamental values of traditional right-wing ideology, such as the integrity of the entire land of Israel and the dedication of “renewalist Zionists” to settlement construction. The prevailing belief is that this flexible right will remain loyal to the Likud party as long as the cost is not excessively high. However, should the price of supporting Likud increase significantly, the majority of the flexible right would not hesitate to abandon Netanyahu at any future juncture, leaving him to face his fate alone. This is particularly relevant given that Iran is contemplating a response to an imminent Israeli attack, which could lead to dire consequences, especially since Netanyahu has few significant achievements left to pursue, aside from the issue of hostages held by Hamas. The only viable solution remains a return to rationality and seizing the opportunity presented by the absence of Sinwar as a justification to halt hostilities and pursue a two-state solution before it is too late.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
