Iran has miscalculated. For years, the Ayatollah regime and its proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, Assad, and the Yemeni Houthi—have been lavishly funded with the aim of eradicating the “Great Satan” of Israel from the region. However, it now appears that the Iranian regime has lost its pawns on the geopolitical chessboard, and it must navigate a new reality that was once unimaginable, even in its worst nightmares.
Hezbollah in Lebanon is on the brink of collapse, the Assad regime in Syria—once Iran’s most vital lifeline—has fallen, and Hamas in Gaza is teetering on the edge. The only remaining ally is the Houthi militias in Yemen.
Fourteen months into the war that began on 7 October 2023, a temporary ceasefire has been declared in Lebanon, while fighting in Gaza has subsided following a ceasefire announcement. Rocket attacks on Israel from Iraq have also decreased, but the Houthi in Yemen shows no signs of stopping.
Throughout this period, Houthi has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Iran, despite doctrinal differences. While Iranians are Twelver Shiite, Houthi is Zaidi. Their relationship is not a natural alliance but rather a convergence on most issues based on shared interests and a mutual hostility towards the West, particularly the United States and Israel. Tehran’s influence over Houthi will be closely tied to the evolving situation in Yemen and the internal power dynamics, which currently favour Houthi. Thus, one should not expect political decisions made in Tehran to be binding on their Yemeni proxies.
This is evident in the current situation, where most fronts have quieted, except for the missiles launched from Yemen towards Israeli cities. It seems as if Houthi wants to assure everyone that they are not like Hezbollah in Lebanon and that they are politically independent from Iran, even if their positions do not always align. Houthi has its own interests that must be the focus of any negotiations with Sana’a, not Tehran or any other capital.
Even when a ceasefire agreement was signed with Hezbollah a month ago under French auspices, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, declared that the “resistance” would continue, as it is Iran’s ultimate goal. There are tactical pauses, which may sometimes apply to all of Iran’s proxies and sometimes only to some.
Unlike Iran’s other proxies, Houthi has posed a global threat since the war began on 7 October. Its strategic location north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the southern entrance to the Red Sea through which 14% of global seaborne trade passes, has enabled them to disrupt maritime traffic in the region. The threat to shipping lanes has forced vessels to sail around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope instead of through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, extending supply chains by at least two weeks. Egypt, which normally derives 2% of its GDP from Suez Canal tolls, has been severely impacted. The head of the Suez Canal Authority stated that revenues from the canal in the 2023-2024 fiscal year totalled $7.2bn, significantly lower than the $9.4bn total in the previous year.
Houthi will remain a global security threat for several reasons: their control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the entrance to the Red Sea; their geographical proximity to oil production sources; their possession of an unknown stockpile of ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometres; continued Iranian support and difficult-to-control supply routes; and the mountainous terrain, which provides protection from air strikes.
Houthi is also a destabilizing factor within Yemen itself. The internationally recognized Yemeni government resides in Aden. According to the World Bank, Yemen lost 42% of its revenue in the first half of 2024. Damage to oil exports and reliance on imported goods caused the Yemeni rial to depreciate from 1,619 against the US dollar in January to 1,917 in August 2024. There are reports of food shortages in some parts of the country. According to the International Monetary Fund, Yemen’s GDP will contract by 1% in 2024, following a 2% contraction last year.
Another factor to consider is geography: the Houthi group is approximately 2,000 kilometres from Israel, and Yemen is a vast country. Israel has no prior experience with military operations in that region, which involves long flight times and unfamiliar terrain. It also lacks intelligence and information infrastructure about the country, unlike Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly vowed that Houthi will pay a heavy price for their attacks, Israeli strikes on Houthi military bases and targets in Yemen have not yet inflicted significant defeats on their leadership. Meanwhile, Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the Houthi spokesperson, in their characteristically defiant appearances, continue to issue direct threats against the United States, the United Kingdom, and especially Israel.
Iran is expected to continue supplying the Houthi not only with weapons and military equipment but also with directives to persist in their attacks on Israel. Now, Israel, Iran, and Sana’a await the inauguration of US President Donald Trump, hoping that the new administration will have a vision or a potential deal to restore calm to the region or pave the way for a decisive attack against Houthi, imposing a maritime and air blockade on Yemen to cut off the Iranian supply lines that fuel them and send a strong message to the Iranian mullahs, who are reeling from internal and external blows.
The question remains: what is the ultimate goal of Houthi? What will 50,000 to 100,000 armed fighters in Sana’a do after Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire? The only answer is to claim legitimacy over all of Yemen.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
