Côte d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara announced in his January 2025 New Year’s speech the withdrawal of French troops from the country by 2025. This announcement, according to the Pan-African non-profit policy research organisation African Narratives, marks a significant turning point in Franco-African relations, reflecting broader shifts in the political and security landscape across the continent.
The withdrawal is part of a wider trend of decreasing French military presence in West Africa, with France planning to reduce its forces from 2,200 to 600 soldiers, as reported by Reuters. Simultaneously, Senegal’s President Macky Sall declared an end to all foreign military presence in Senegal starting in 2025. These developments follow a year of escalating tensions and a reassessment of the traditional power dynamics between France and several African nations.
In 2024, African demands for the departure of French troops intensified, a move described by African Narratives as a significant setback to Paris’ influence in Africa. This shift is part of a wider trend of African countries reorganising their relationships with major international powers, moving away from long-standing French dominance.
The report highlights a number of factors contributing to this change, including the gradual withdrawal of French troops from several countries following rising opposition to their presence. This began with Mali’s expulsion of French troops in 2022, followed by similar actions in Burkina Faso and Chad.
France completed its withdrawal from Mali in 2024 after nine years of intervention in Operation Barkhane, and Mali subsequently cancelled its defense agreements with France. Burkina Faso also expelled French diplomats in May 2024, accusing them of “subversive activities.” Chad began implementing a plan for the gradual withdrawal of French troops in December 2024, handing over the military base in Faya to local authorities.
This withdrawal coincides with accusations levelled against France of supporting armed groups in the Sahel by providing intelligence that facilitates attacks. While France has not responded to these accusations, they fuel anti-French sentiment and are often used to mask the failures of African governments to achieve security. Sahelian media plays a significant role in amplifying these accusations, portraying France’s military bases as tools for information gathering and influence. In Senegal, the rise of the PASTEF party in the 2024 legislative elections has further intensified accusations of French interference, with Russia increasingly perceived as an alternative partner.
The rise of China and Russia in Africa has further complicated the situation for France. China’s focus on economic interests and non-interference has made it a preferred partner for many African countries, while Russia has exploited the vacuum left by the US and France, particularly in the Sahel, strengthening its security role through cooperation with local armed forces. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to four African countries in January 2025, continuing an annual tradition, underscores China’s growing engagement.
Nashwa Abdelnaby, the report author identifies several reasons behind President Ouattara’s decision, including the launch of his election campaign, concerns about a potential military coup, and a desire to reduce tensions with other African countries and mitigate rising anti-French sentiment. The report outlines three potential scenarios for the future of Franco-Ivorian relations: escalating tensions and a complete break, limited military and security cooperation, and strengthened economic cooperation.
African Narratives’ analysis suggests three likely scenarios for France’s future in Africa: a near-zeroing of its presence, economic substitution, and a last-place re-substitution attempt. The report highlights the significant shift away from the CFA franc, a key tool of French economic dominance, and the increasing economic partnerships between African nations and China, Russia, and India. France’s attempts to improve economic partnerships, as seen in Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s visit to Paris in late November 2024, might prove insufficient to stem the tide of change.
French President Emmanuel Macron’s January 2025 comments defending French intervention in Africa further exacerbated tensions, leading to strong condemnations from Chad and Senegal. This could accelerate the decline of French influence and encourage other African countries to follow suit. Ultimately, the report concludes that 2025 may mark a pivotal year for African disengagement from French influence, with a growing number of nations breaking away from its sphere of influence.
