The draft of Syria’s temporary constitutional declaration, recently signed by interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, has sparked widespread debate among the nation’s political and social factions. The provisions of this constitution have faced sharp criticism, particularly concerning the president’s extensive powers. The draft bestows nearly absolute authority upon the president, including appointing one-third of the People’s Assembly members, declaring a state of emergency, selecting Constitutional Court members, dismissing ministers, and wielding other executive privileges that consolidate decision-making in a single office. This centralization of power raises fears of a return to authoritarian rule reminiscent of the previous regime. While the draft ostensibly upholds the principle of separation of powers, its structure effectively places legislative authority under executive control rather than within an independent, democratically elected body.
Rather than relying on democratic elections, the draft mandates the appointment of People’s Assembly members, undermining the legitimacy of the political process during this transitional phase. For instance, Article 25 grants sweeping legislative powers to an appointed council that should belong exclusively to an elected body. This raises fundamental questions about the council’s ability to genuinely represent the Syrian people, particularly in the absence of clear electoral mechanisms during a transitional period expected to span three to five years.
The Kurdish self-administration has strongly opposed the draft, arguing that it disregards Syria’s ethnic and cultural diversity. The Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the Kurdish movement, rejected the declaration, denouncing it as a continuation of the traditional governance model of the former Baathist government. This rejection highlights the draft’s failure to present an inclusive political vision that integrates Syria’s diverse communities, such as the Kurds and Druze, into national decision-making. Rather than fostering national unity, the draft risks deepening existing divisions.
Although the draft emphasizes transitional justice and the criminalization of past regime violations, it lacks specific mechanisms for implementation. The absence of clear frameworks for accountability or victim compensation casts doubt on the sincerity of these commitments, reducing them to political rhetoric rather than actionable policies.
Despite claims of breaking from the past, the draft remains rooted in previous constitutions, such as the 1950 Constitution, without introducing fundamental reforms that align with the aspirations of the Syrian revolution. While interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has criticized the 2012 Constitution as a product of dictatorship, the new draft does not fully abandon the centralized governance model. This suggests an attempt to preserve institutional stability at the cost of the sweeping political transformation demanded by many Syrians.
While the temporary constitutional declaration aims to provide a legal framework for the transitional period, it faces significant obstacles, including excessive concentration of power, weak democratic representation, and the marginalization of Syria’s diverse communities. Instead of fulfilling Syrians’ hopes for a genuinely new political system that honors their sacrifices, it risks serving as little more than a rebranded extension of the old regime. More critically, this declaration has the potential to trigger further instability—politically, socially, economically, and militarily.
Local and regional reactions to the draft could lead to escalation. Key factions, particularly within Kurdish and Druze communities, have rejected it as unrepresentative of Syria’s diversity and unresponsive to demands for political inclusivity. If these groups—especially those backed by the Syrian Democratic Forces—feel marginalized or threatened, they may resort to military escalation or pursue further autonomy, heightening the risk of conflict.
The lack of a broad national consensus surrounding the draft presents another major challenge. It was not the product of an inclusive dialogue among all Syrian factions, including armed opposition groups in northwestern Syria and Turkish-backed militias. Their exclusion may prompt them to reject the transitional government’s legitimacy outright, potentially leading to renewed military confrontations, particularly if they perceive their interests as overlooked.
Public frustration is mounting. Many Syrians who fought against the previous regime view the draft as a mere continuation of the old system under a different name. The concentration of power in the interim president’s hands, combined with the absence of immediate elections, has fueled concerns that the transition is not a genuine step toward democracy. These frustrations could manifest in protests or civil disobedience, which, given Syria’s proliferation of armed factions, could quickly escalate into violent clashes.
Regional powers—including Turkey, Iran, and Russia—have their own stakes in Syria and may seek to exploit the draft’s weaknesses to further their influence. Turkey may oppose any constitution that fails to curb Kurdish autonomy or safeguard its interests in northern Syria. Iran, in contrast, may view the draft as a threat if it diminishes its military and political foothold in the country. Such foreign interventions could further complicate Syria’s fragile situation.
The security landscape remains precarious. If the transitional government fails to assert control over the entire country—especially given the weakened state of the national military following the collapse of the previous regime—armed groups may compete for territorial dominance, exacerbating instability. A prolonged security vacuum could pave the way for further violence and disorder.
Despite some expressions of international support, including from the European Union and Canada, the sustainability of this backing remains uncertain. Foreign aid and political endorsements are often conditional on demonstrating stability and effective governance. Any failure in this regard could lead to a withdrawal of support, further exacerbating Syria’s political and economic fragility.
The opposition itself remains fragmented. Armed groups in the northwest and northeast continue to suffer from internal divisions and dependence on external backers. The absence of a unifying force capable of consolidating opposition factions prolongs the conflict and weakens the transitional government’s credibility. Without a clear resolution, Syria risks sinking further into political paralysis and violence.
The temporary constitutional declaration, rather than fostering stability, risks further destabilizing Syria due to the lack of national consensus, the marginalization of key political groups, and the looming security vacuum. However, the extent of its impact depends on the transitional government’s ability to address domestic opposition and secure broader regional and international support. At present, Syria remains precariously balanced, teetering between renewed conflict and the potential for stabilization. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether this draft serves as a foundation for peace or a catalyst for further unrest.
Restoring order under this controversial constitutional declaration requires a comprehensive approach that addresses political, social, and security challenges. To achieve sustainable stability and prevent further escalation, several measures must be taken. First, a truly inclusive national dialogue should be convened, incorporating all Syrian factions—including Kurdish self-administration authorities, opposition groups, and civil society representatives—under international mediation to ensure neutrality. Second, the draft must be amended to reflect Syria’s pluralism, including constitutional guarantees for the cultural and political rights of marginalized groups and a reduction of the president’s powers in favour of an elected legislature.
Enhancing democratic legitimacy is also critical. Instead of relying on an appointed legislature for three to five years, a roadmap for early elections—preferably within one to two years—should be established, with international oversight to ensure transparency. Civil society organizations and activists must actively shape transitional policies to guarantee broader representation.
A decentralized governance model, granting regions like the northeast and northwest a degree of self-administration while preserving national unity, could ease tensions with Kurdish and Turkish-backed factions, reducing the risk of fragmentation. Explicit constitutional protections for religious and ethnic minorities are also essential to reassure vulnerable communities.
A phased plan for disarming militias and integrating fighters into a unified national army or economic rehabilitation programs is crucial. Security sector reforms must ensure that military and intelligence institutions remain neutral and representative of all Syrians, with international oversight preventing a return to authoritarianism.
Finally, diplomatic negotiations with key foreign actors—potentially mediated by the United Nations or the United States—could help mitigate external interference, fostering a more stable transition.
Success ultimately hinges on the transitional government’s ability to engage all relevant actors and a cohesive international effort that translates statements into tangible actions. If these conditions are met, Syria may finally move toward genuine recovery rather than another cycle of upheaval.
Dr. Hatem Sadek: Professor at Helwan University
