Talk to one of the newly-arrived United Nations peacekeepers in South Lebanon and one will quickly learn that their principle force protection concern has little to do with Lebanon’s Hezbollah guerrillas, Israeli aerial provocations or indeed potential ill-feeling from the local population. Rather, it’s Al-Qaeda’s possibly taking advantage of nearly 10,000 foreign, mainly Western, troops deployed in Lebanon’s deep south that is giving them pause for thought. And with good reason. Al-Qaeda’s brand of Sunni militancy has taken root in Lebanon in recent years, feeding upon the insurgency in Iraq where dozens, maybe hundreds, of young Lebanese and Palestinian Sunnis have fought American and British troops and returned home inspired by their experiences. It is a more than usually turbulent Lebanon that has greeted the fresh reinforcements to the expanding UN Interim Force in Lebanon, or Unifil. No sooner had the devastating month-long war between Hezbollah and Israel ended last August, that the country was mired in a deep political crisis between the Western-backed government and a Hezbollah-led opposition supported by Syria and Iran. The assassination of Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon’s industry minister and a member of the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition, has left many Lebanese wondering whether the country is on the brink of civil war. Ironically, however, the political tensions in Beirut and the circumstances arising from the Hezbollah-Israel war have ensured a period of relative stability along the traditionally volatile Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah fought an impressive military campaign against the Israeli military, which clearly underestimated its foe. Israeli troops, whose battle-experience in recent years has been confined mainly to shooting teenage Palestinian stone throwers in the occupied Palestinian territories, found themselves up against probably the most adept guerrilla force in the world. The war was supposed to erode Hezbollah’s military capabilities, but it had little impact, and the Lebanese group emerged from the conflict declaring it a “divine victory. Still, it is too soon to say who really won the war. Although Hezbollah’s stock soared immeasurably in the Arab and Islamic world (if not in Lebanon) due to its military performance, it has lost its previous autonomy in the border area. The intricate network of bunkers, firing positions, tunnels, arms depots and observation posts that Hezbollah installed in the past six years has been abandoned. The deployment of a strengthened Unifil and, more crucially, 15,000 Lebanese troops south of the Litani River, has made it politically inopportune and practically difficult for Hezbollah to return to the prewar situation. That is a reason for Hezbollah’s bold gambit to bring down the government of Prime Minister Fouad Seniora. Initially, Hezbollah and its allies sought an expansion of the 24-seat cabinet, granting the opposition a veto-wielding one-third-plus-one share of portfolios. That would have allow the pro-Syrians to block any legislation deemed unfavorable to them and their backers in Damascus and Tehran, including the formation of a mixed Lebanese-international tribunal to try the killers of the late prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and any potential expansion of Unifil’s mandate. When the March 14-dominated government refused to yield, six pro-Syrian ministers quit, including all five Shiites, and Hezbollah vowed to launch mass demonstrations to press for early parliamentary elections. A by-product of the political maneuverings in Beirut is that Hezbollah is keeping a low profile in the South. Many of its fighters are still there, but that is because they live in the area. It is almost certainly true that Hezbollah is presently replenishing its arsenal of rockets and anti-tank missiles, and there are rumors that the party is setting up a new underground line of defense north of the Litani River. Hezbollah’s top military commanders are also analyzing the results of the war and assessing future strategies and tactics. One possibility for anti-Israel military action by Hezbollah is to try and shoot down an Israeli jet. Israel’s persistence in continuing overflights in Lebanese airspace in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has brought it into confrontation with Unifil and incurred the anger of leading troop-contributing nations, notably France. Israeli jets have twice mock dive-bombed the French battalion headquarters, apparently nearly causing the peacekeepers to fire anti-aircraft missiles in defense. Israeli warplanes have also buzzed German navy ships off the Lebanese coastline, part of Unifil’s maritime component. Hezbollah was disappointed during the war to have had so little success in shooting down Israeli aircraft. The only success was against a troop transport helicopter struck by an anti-tank missile as it was taking off, killing all five crewmembers. Few tears would be shed in Lebanon if Hezbollah were able to shoot down an Israeli jet, burnishing its self-declared credentials as the only force capable of defending Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli aggression. Still, if the pro-Syrian opposition brings down the government and replace it with one more in tune with Damascus, it will enhance Hezbollah’s freedom of action in the south. Unifil’s peacekeepers may then have to worry about Hezbollah as well the threat posed by Sunni jihadists.
Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based journalist and author of “Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafiq Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
