In the post-Sept. 11, 2001 world it is thoroughly understandable that the United States should reorganize its military, diplomatic, and military resources to engage, understand, and, if required, contest militant Islam. Since those tragic events in 2001, Washington has initiated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; it has seized “enemy combatants, and has detained and interrogated them at Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba and other clandestine locations around the world; and it has radically reformed domestic terrorism laws in an effort to detect, deter, and destroy enemies of the country.
But is the strategy comprehensive, or is it overly skewed toward military initiatives without taking into account measures that are needed to win the “soft war of educating the minds and nurturing the bodies of putative enemies of the US? My contention is that military investments are necessary and can be prudent. However, American investments in education and healthcare overseas, which are equally important in this “soft war, seem to be unsatisfactorily under-funded y the Bush administration. Since September 11 and the apparent permanent reversal of American military fortunes in the war in Iraq, it has become abundantly clear to petroleum analysts around the world that the Middle East, which serves the world as a critical source for oil and natural gas, is either unstable, at risk, or inaccessible for investment and exploitation.
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest depository of petroleum reserves, survives for the moment, yet it suffers from internal dissension and the possibility of the eventual demise of the Al-Saud regime. Iraq, thanks to its significant sources of petroleum in the Basra area, may sell the product to world consumers, but that source is irregular and because of its location may eventually fall under the tutelage of Iranian political or economic forces. Meanwhile, America’s consistent failure to engage in diplomacy with Iran since 1979 means that China has primary access to petroleum there. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi all are protected by an American military umbrella meaning that – at least for the moment – these sources of petroleum are comparatively secure. The general lack of security in the Middle East means that the US and other consumers of petroleum must necessarily look toward Africa for alternate sources of petroleum. Indonesia and Russia may also serve as providers to Western markets but, given the proximity of the west coast of Africa to Western European and American markets, Africa’s petroleum necessarily must be considered an alternative to Middle Eastern oil. It also happens to be in Africa that petroleum and Islam mix. Because of the instability in the Middle East, the US has come up with a military strategy to deal with the question of Islamic terrorism and the protection of petroleum assets in Africa.
To cite just one example of this reorientation in strategy, in May 2003 the NATO supreme commander, General James Jones, said that the Navy’s Sixth Fleet that is based in Naples, Italy, would eventually “[S]pend half the time going down the west coast of Africa. So Africa has become a critical area of geopolitical concern for reasons of religious activism and petroleum. The US has two plans for military joint training operations on the African continent. The first is the Global Peace Operations Initiative begun during fiscal year 2006. That initiative provided $100.4 million in FY 2006 and requested $102.6 million for FY 2007 to train and equip battalions and specialty units in Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Gabon and Nigeria. The amount involved here is very modest. On average the amount dedicated per country averages close to $800,000 per recipient. Of more direct interest to the subject here is the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which is an outgrowth of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The PSI was started right after September 11 and spent approximately $16 million during 2002-2003 to deploy teams of Special Operations soldiers to Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment.
The big media coup in this initiative occurred when militants of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Chad were tracked down during 2004. The TSCTI received $3 million dollars in funding during FY 2005 and was scheduled to receive $100 million yearly from FY 2007 through FY 2011, resulting in a total of $500 million. Troops to be trained under this program would include Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. It is clear that this new program in its expanded form takes cognizance of the double nexus between maintaining state stability and security and maintaining access to petroleum and natural gas sources. The inclusion of Algeria, Nigeria and Tunisia and the design of the new military training program prove that US Department of Defense planners understand the need to be engaged both militarily and socially in these key countries.
The new program is multi-departmental, involving the State Department in airport security, the Treasury Department in money laundering and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in educational and health programs. What is clear from a review of the new program is that the military engagement, or “the hard power, is clearly there. What is equally clear is that the “soft power, or the need to address the question of education and health care, is not well funded. In this new security arrangement, Algeria is the biggest “winner. Besides the military training received, the country has been able to purchase $276 million in armaments from the US government during 2005 alone. In addition, Algeria has purchased $6.1 million dollars in armaments from private markets. The second largest beneficiary from these changes in American policy has been Morocco. In 2005 it was able to purchase $18 million in armaments from the US government and $3.9 million in private markets. US government arms purchases by the other beneficiary countries in these programs have been paltry. The emergence of Algeria as a key player in these new security arrangements may speak volumes about future American-Algerian cooperation. If we were to simply “follow the money, we would have to assume that Algeria and the United States may have a newly meaningful and enhanced military, intelligence, and diplomatic relationship. Regarding the “soft aspect of this analysis, this is the area where much greater attention and funding are warranted. Ultimately, it will be new educational systems and enhanced healthcare delivery systems that will convert the enemies of America into friends.
It would seem that a modest investment in educational and healthcare initiatives would reap substantial benefits. Upon a review of USAID programs for the countries discussed here, however, it seems that “soft investment is missing. For example, in Mali USAID program expenditure for FY 2007 is budgeted to amount to just under $32 million, to be spread over health care, basic education, governance, economic growth and communications projects. During the same period and on the same programs, USAID has budgeted less than $19 million for Nigeria. There is nothing for Chad, Mauritania or Niger. In other words, with the exception of Mali, sufficient funds have not been made available for basic education and healthcare in at least four critical countries. This is due to either poor planning or poor execution of policy – especially given what we already know about the ameliorative effect that these kinds of initiatives have on positive public perceptions of the US.
Why the military aspect of this anti-terrorist initiative in the Sahel has been funded while the non-military programs have been neglected is difficult to comprehend. Beyond the lack of balance in the appropriations for “hard and “soft initiatives, the other aspect that seems to be at least somewhat misguided is that most of the mil
itary training has taken place in the Sahara desert. The expenditure of $500 million over a five-year period may be entirely appropriate if the center of gravity for the Islamist movement were located in the desert. Quite evidently, that is not the case.
Militant Islamism is an urban phenomenon. In urban areas, educational systems are often under-funded and directed by Islamists (often with Saudi Arabian, Moroccan or Libyan support). Improving standards of hygiene and medical care would improve relations between the US and the residents of beneficiary countries. In Niger, for example, Cuba has sent hundreds of doctors who have helped improve health care there by reforming hygienic methods and providing rudimentary medicines. How can Cuba afford to send hundreds of doctors to Niger while the United States cannot? Can Washington afford not to? Beyond the provision of educational and medical support in urban areas, the last missing element in this effort to detect and monitor militant Islamism involves the need to collect basic intelligence or information regarding the socio-economic causes for militant Islamism. At least from the public information that is available, it seems that the United States has a limited presence on the ground in urban environments where Islamists live and recruit.
It would seem that an almost immediate investment in human intelligence gathering capabilities is needed in places like Kano and Lagos in Nigeria, Abidjan in Ivory Coast, Monrovia in Liberia, Freetown in Sierra Leone, and Dakar in Senegal. Finally, one has to underscore that the traditional forms of Islam that have been practiced in Africa over centuries (especially variants of Sufi Islam) have never posed a security risk to the interests of the United States. It is only one smaller, more violent variant of militant Islam that needs regular surveillance and counter-measures. This violent form of Islam finds political expression because real and legitimate frustrations exist in many Muslim communities regarding failed educational systems, sub-standard healthcare delivery systems, high rates of infant mortality, and endemic poverty. It seems that while the US must continue with its investment in military programs, to avoid the “soft power alternatives that are both available and inexpensive would seem to work only to the detriment of American security.
Ricardo Rene Laremont is professor of political science and sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter that publishes commentaries on Middle Eastern and Islamic topics.
