There is growing concern among the Western coalition forces about the worsening situation in Afghanistan. The insurgency has recently shown its bloodiest face since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001 and represents a ticking time bomb for the collapse of US policies in the country. The fallout of American policies in Iraq has been felt across the region, especially in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have launched a series of successful offensives against the International Security Assistance Force.
Afghanistan is a test for NATO’s credibility. With a 35,000-strong force currently deployed there, the ISAF is attempting to preempt a strong Taliban offensive in the coming spring months. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ recent visit to Pakistan will be followed by that of NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in the coming weeks. While the NATO command acknowledges the difficulties and is engaged in coordinating its strategy with neighboring Pakistan, there is a need to review the current policies being pursued in Afghanistan.
Gates has admitted that the United States made a mistake in neglecting Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. That eventually led to the growth of extremism and resulted in the September 11, 2001 attacks. The monumental mistake the US made was that it did not capitalize on the tremendous goodwill various jihadist groups in Afghanistan had at the time for the West and the US and implement a massive economic reconstruction program; rather the warring factions were left to fight among themselves and consolidate their power bases, the whole purpose being for them to exhaust their weapons and arms supplies.
The US is currently making a bigger mistake by helping the Taliban to grow into a nationalist liberating force by supporting a government in Kabul dominated by a minority of the so-called Northern Alliance. Despite the fact that President Hamid Karzai is a Pashtun, the Pashtuns have been thoroughly sidelined in the government. It is also felt that the reconstruction has not progressed in an effective manner because of the ineffectual rule of the central government.
The US needs to redress the imbalance that has shaped the strategic dynamics within the Afghan political scenario. By alienating the Pashtuns, the US has committed a grave error; the Pashtuns are known for their determination and strength in repelling any perceived foreign occupying force. A majority of the Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, perceive the presence of the Western forces as they did the Soviet occupation – as an occupying force. This alienation has resulted in the Pashtuns’ lending indirect support to the Taliban because it is in the forefront of the resistance against Western forces and the Afghan government.
The immediate measures that the United States and its partners need to implement to reverse their mistakes are: First, to differentiate between hard-line Taliban with possible links to Al-Qaeda and the majority of the Pashtuns who are fighting a genuine resistance war, but who may be supporting the Taliban as part of an alliance against the foreign forces. Second, review and restructure major social reforms in order to not incur the animosity of traditional Pashtun society; the more the US tries to enforce its agenda, the more it pushes the people toward the Taliban.
Third, ensure Pashtuns are dealt with in an evenhanded way in the power-sharing arrangements in the government, and are not subjected to isolation and persecution. This could be done according to the traditional Pashtun nikat system – where power is shared according to the proportion of tribes and sub-tribes – which worked well in the pre-Soviet times.
Fourth, address the lack of strong institutions and an effective central government, rampant corruption, large-scale narcotics production that in turn perpetuates the vicious cycle fuelling the insurgency, and the absence of a strong military. The establishment of a strong military is possible only with a strong government; the willing recruitment of people can only come about if people feel that they represent a proper Afghan government and not a weak regime whose viability depends upon foreign forces.
Fifth, it is imperative that for any strategic policy to succeed in Afghanistan, the US and the coalition must understand and work within the tribal system.
And sixth, an extremely important US measure must be to rehabilitate the 3 million Afghan refugees now in Pakistan in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot and should not be expected to shoulder this responsibility alone.
During Gates’ visit to Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to the cause, but sought help in coordinating and drawing a broader strategic framework whereby joint efforts need to be put in place not just by Pakistan, but also the Afghan government, the US forces and the ISAF troops. Pakistan’s role is crucial in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. There have been accusations that certain elements within Pakistan are abetting the Taliban and providing a haven and resources to it. But Pakistan has lost more then 700 soldiers and officers fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the border areas of Afghanistan. The Waziristan tribal deal of September 2006 was important because it accorded responsibility to the tribal areas to safeguard their interest as well as that of the country, and included monitoring all alien movements.
In the face of constant criticism by the Afghan government, Pakistan has proposed mining and fencing its entire 2,200 kilometer-long border with Afghanistan. However, after objections, Pakistan has decided to go for selective fencing to improve border monitoring of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Musharraf recently admitted that due to the difficulties that the Pakistani security forces are facing in policing the border, it may be possible that the Taliban are taking advantage of this. Though Pakistan has established 980 security posts and deployed over 80,000 troops on its border with Afghanistan, it cannot ensure that no border violations take place.
Lastly, the fallout of the US policies in Iraq has resulted in a ripple effect across the region, with some conflict tactics being adopted in Afghanistan. The US policy has resulted in inciting a tribal conflict that has played into the hands of Al-Qaeda. Afghanistan, and increasingly Pakistan, is becoming a target of suicide attacks, a phenomenon unheard of even during the Soviet invasion. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices is also a new development. The growth of these tactics is largely due to its effectiveness. Whether suicide attacks are done on the basis of religion, tribal honor, or out of desperation and extreme poverty, the society has become so radical that the commanders of the insurgency seem to find enough persons ready to carry out such actions.
The US and ISAF are in danger of being caught in an Afghan quagmire unless their policies and strategy are reviewed. There is a need to disengage in a way that does not alienate the Pashtuns, but rather integrates them in a centralized system that is self sustaining and does not have to depend on the supporting role of the Western forces. Further, the Western powers need to address the issue of creating a strong central government in Afghanistan and implementing a collective security mechanism with the cooperation of the Pakistani and Afghan governments to fight the Taliban and other terrorist elements.
Faryal Leghari is a researcher in the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with the center.
