In the month since the agreement reached in Mecca between Fatah and Hamas, the implications for Palestine and the region have become increasingly apparent. The “Mecca agreement may have registered in the international media mainly for its role in the formation of a Palestinian national-unity government after many torments and trials; but the significance of the pact is to be found as much in how it affects the regional balance of power around Palestine as in Palestine itself. The most evident success belongs to Riyadh, in hosting and facilitating the agreement. In contrast to this Saudi regional triumph, Iran and Syria have reasons to be wary. Hamas has been one of the strongest cards in Tehran’s and Damascus’ broader regional confrontation with the United States and Israel; now this seems to be slipping away without any gains in return. Egypt, for its part, is not particularly pleased either, as it sees the long-awaited (and still far from secure) reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas being engineered far from Cairo’s hands. This means a further blow to the already diminishing Egyptian role in regional politics. Israel, meanwhile, is confused and is still making up its mind about whether this development is a welcome step in terms of its own interests. In this mosaic, the satisfaction of Riyadh may be easiest to grasp. Saudi involvement in Fatah-Hamas politics implies an injection of a measure of moderation that can in principle circumvent rising Iranian influence (particularly over Hamas). At the same time, the terms agreed at Mecca have been rightly seen as on the whole favoring Hamas. Hamas, after all, did not succumb to all three Israeli-American conditions for opening contact: recognizing Israel, denouncing violence, and acknowledging the previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. In addition to Hamas’ own firmness on these points, Fatah’s wish to see the Saudis having a stronger influence over Hamas than Iran was a major driving-force in its acceptance of only slight modifications in Hamas’ positions. Mecca came after efforts to bring Fatah and Hamas onto common ground – mediated by Egypt, Qatar and Syria – went nowhere. Hamas saw the Egyptians as being tacitly partial, siding with Fatah and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Moreover, Egypt’s stance is governed by its national-security concerns, particularly regarding the situation in Gaza and the possibility of any spillover of violence across the border to Egypt. Cairo sees a Gaza ruled by Hamas – a sister organization to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – as a nightmare that it wants to end. Fatah’s attitude toward the Syrians is a mirror-image of Hamas’ towards Egypt. It sees Damascus as pro-Hamas, and against the Oslo Accords that it negotiated. The meetings between Hamas and Fatah leaders in Damascus before Mecca yielded no outcome. The Qatari mediation was also short-lived, partly because of Fatah’s suspicion that Qatar is one of the Hamas leaders’ “backyards (the emirate hosted them after their expulsion from Jordan in 1999). Iran, for its part, was not interested in reconciling Hamas with Fatah and exercised no effort on this front. Against this background, the Saudis held several cards: they were equally distanced from Fatah and Hamas, they retained regional and diplomatic leverage, and they could be credited with the ability to “market any agreement to the Americans and the West in general. The Saudis themselves were less concerned with the contents of any such agreement than with countering rising Iranian influence in the region by securing a wide entry-point into the heart of the Palestinian issue. The Saudi intervention also came at a favorable moment to exploit a sudden fall in popular Arab support for Iran. The declining popularity was notable after Iran’s jubilation over the hanging of Saddam Hussein, and because of its alliance with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government that carried out the execution. By seizing this unexpected moment of anti-Iranian sentiment among many Arabs and Palestinians, the Saudis could also rely on concern within Hamas ranks that a strong association with Iran at such a tricky moment would damage the movement’s popularity. These developments show that the formation of a Palestinian unity government after Mecca has little to do with the heart of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis and much to do with regional politics and rivalries. Such a government, once it is established, will have a direct bearing on peace talks with Israel, but in fact the greater consequence of the Mecca agreement lies elsewhere: in its impact on Iran. The Americans and Israelis are neither ready nor in a mood to take serious steps in talks with the Palestinians, regardless of the internal make-up of the new Palestinian leadership. The current US obsessions are Iraq and Iran. The post-Mecca visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Palestine, Israel, and other countries in the region was a public relations exercise designed merely to reduce Arab anger over US policies. The shaky Israeli government has suffered from a series of scandals of all sorts at all levels after the non-victory and almost-defeat in the summer war against Hizbullah. It too lacks solid ground on which to move toward peace. The little energy that the exhausted government has left is expended in drawing up options to counter Iran’s nuclear program. There is no Israeli offer on “peace talks that displays seriousness to the Palestinians. Even the much-discussed Quartet “road map has been on the shelf for years, covered in the dust of Israeli reservations and now the three unachievable conditions imposed on the Hamas-led government. Before Hamas’ election in January 2006, Israel was not interested in dealing with Abbas, the most moderate Palestinian politician, and did not consider him a partner for peace. How then could Israel accept that a government led by Hamas might be such a partner? Even if Hamas met all the conditions imposed on it, it would hardly secure the confidence of Israelis, who only trusted Abbas after decades of moderation. The deeper meaning of Mecca is that the Saudis exerted their heavy diplomatic (and financial) weight to break the Palestinian impasse almost certainly with prior American consent – or at least with the assurance that Washington would not be displeased with an outcome that could reduce Iranian influence over Hamas. Yet the American official line so far has been to continue to refuse dealing with any Palestinian government led by or including Hamas, unless it accepts the three conditions. By imposing those conditions on Hamas, the Americans and Europeans have made it difficult for themselves and for Hamas to meet somewhere in between. Thus, the green light to the Saudis could be interpreted as a desperate invitation to a pro-American third party to intervene. In that way, American, Israeli and European concerns about the rise of Iranian influence could be seriously allayed on the Palestinian front; while there would be no visible backtrack on the three conditions, to avoid giving Hamas the appearance of victory. One component of such an intervention might be that humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people will be resumed from different sources (Saudi and European), while the Americans pretend to look the other way. This would be far from an overall solution, but in the short term the moral dilemma of punishing the Palestinian people for electing Hamas would at least come to an end. Khaled Hroubis an Arab media specialist and director of the Cambridge Arab Media Project, University of Cambridge. This commentary first appeared on the Open Democracy Website.
The real meaning of the Mecca agreement
