It is hard to get away from a central fact of Middle Eastern politics and statehood: the significant role played by the military and security forces in the business of government and the exercise of public authority. This is a largely unaddressed issue in the galaxy of political and economic reform issues being debated throughout the Arab world and other Asian and African states. The role of the military in public life has been a constant of Middle Eastern statehood since shortly after the advent of modern independent countries in the early 20th century. In some countries the situation has probably worsened in recent years, as assorted military institutions – the armed forces, intelligence agencies, police and internal security services – play a more dominant and public role in decision-making. The Arab world collectively remains the last non-democratic part of the world for several reasons. One of these is the military sector’s direct control over institutions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Turkey is an important and rare case study in how civilian-military relations can evolve over time, and generally peacefully, to allow elected civilian politicians to exercise greater control over the military. That process is still underway, moving unevenly two steps forward followed by one step backwards, with an occasional sideward shuffle, and reflecting both subtlety and bluntness in the pivotal civilian-military struggle. I was in Istanbul this week at a gathering of international investors and financial analysts. Their positive view of many profitable investments in Turkey seemed unperturbed by the dramatic showdown outside – on the streets, in court, and in Parliament – between the ruling moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the military-backed, largely secular opposition. Turkey’s armed forces have overthrown governments and closed parliaments, worked closely with incumbent governments they liked, and have largely come to terms with the AKP government, after forcing its predecessor Islamist parties out of office and out of existence. The country’s continued movement towards European Union standards has seen the civilian-elected political establishment slowly whittle away the military’s ability to interfere in politics. The military and its many allies in secular political circles have now balked at the prospect of AKP simultaneously controlling Parliament, the prime minister’s office and the presidency, and they moved politically to stop the AKP candidate, Abdullah Gul, from becoming president late last month. An explicitly political process will determine the outcome of this struggle in the months ahead, to the envy of Arab lands where no such thing is likely to occur any time soon. In the Arab world, the relationship between the military and the civilian political class is not so dynamic. It is also not discussed very much in public, which is one reason Arab public sectors tend to be inefficient and dominated by the military. Relationships between the military and the civilian politicians in the Arab world are varied, with precise power configurations reflecting a wide range of factors: colonial histories, post-colonial trajectories, tribal social foundations, the nature and size of royal families, the intrusive role of foreign powers, and the domestic balance sheet of natural wealth and assets. Most Arab military sectors played a constructive foundational role in the early decades of state building, often being the central instrument of state-formation and national cohesion. The military coups that started to define Arab governance, as early as the 1930s in Iraq, slowly saw most Arab “republics transformed into centralized security states by the early 1970s. Security-military organizations operate largely beyond the scrutiny of civilian governments, with neither their budgets nor their activities subjected to any sort of serious oversight or accountability. Many Arab security agencies operate with honor, restraint and efficiency; some others have spilled over into gangsterism, mediocrity and corruption. Most security-military agencies in the Arab world feel they are the guardians of statehood, political governance, public order and national ideology all rolled into one. Therefore, it is not unusual to find security services vetting the appointments of university professors or newspaper editors, while they also hunt down terrorists and others whom they consider threatening. The link between Arab governance and the military-security sector needs to be slowly loosened, and then broken completely. The security agencies must be allowed to play their important defense, intelligence and police functions, while civilian politicians elected by the citizenry define national policy and ideology. One of the few advantages of being the last autocratic region of the world is that we can learn from the transformation of those who democratized before us. An important starting point for such a change to occur peacefully is for citizens and public institutions to start discussing the exact nature of military-civilian relationships in Arab countries. Rami G. Khouriis published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR.
What is Caesar's and what isn't in the Arab world
