In the past few months the Turkish Armed Forces have reportedly deployed over 200,000 soldiers across its border with Iraq, more than all of the American troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan together. If it gets its way – pending government approval – the army will storm northern Iraq and break down the bases from which the Kurdish PKK fighters launch their attacks into Turkey.
Yet the Turkish newspapers top headlines these days are not dealing with the massive planned military operation. Instead, the question on everyone s minds is how the military will respond to the July 22 parliamentary election victory of the Islamic-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The AKP s win did not surprise anyone, including the army. With a remarkable success in the 2002 elections – where it won a third of the votes – and a good economic performance, nothing could stop the AKP from winning the elections again. But nobody expected the final outcome: 46.4 percent of the voters gave their vote to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the charismatic leader of the AKP.
The army s surprise at this was enormous. It proved that the Turkish public supported the Islamic party despite the army s attempts to belittle its popularity by using the thus far winning card: the Islamic threat. On April 27 – three months ahead of the elections – the army s General Staff published a memorandum in which it blamed certain circles of working to wear away the value of secularism in the country.
Challenging the state. [they] are not afraid to exploit the religious beliefs of our people and are attempting to hide their increasing efforts to undermine the state behind the guise of religion, the memorandum added.
The General Staff was clear about its intentions: It must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces. is a strict defender of secularism. [and] will openly display its attitude if the occasion arises, it said.
The army s E-memorandum was answered by the people s memorandum [on Election Day], Prof. Soli Ozel, head of the International Relations Department at Bilgi University in Istanbul, Turkey, told The Media Line.
The elections results were a victory of civilianization over military tutelage, Ozel added. With the AKP s control over the parliament and government (it will probably form a single-party government), the army now worries that the party will also occupy the powerful position of the president. If nothing drastic happens, the AKP s Abdullah Gul will become the next Turkish president.
How will the army react? Will it try to prevent Gul s appointment? And if so, then by what means?
The Turkish army under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – founder of modern, secular Turkey – became a strictly secular body and was bound by law to safeguard and preserve secularism. Thus, the army since the early 20th century, has been engaged on two fronts – the home front and the external front.
Between 1960 and 1980, the military carried out three military coups following political instability and social unrest. But it was in 1997 that the army first engaged in a move against what it perceived as an Islamic threat to the secular order.
The year 1996 marked a significant change in Turkish politics, when for the first time since the secularization of Turkey in the 1920s, an Islamist-leaning party (Refah Partisi – RP) won over 21% of the vote and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister.
Despite the fact that the RP tried to persuade the Turkish public of its moderation and respect for the Ataturk secular tradition, its actions on the ground showed the opposite. People with Islamist backgrounds were appointed as heads of national museums and universities; the Imam-hatips (religious schools) were strengthened; mosques were built on sites that symbolized the secular republic; and prisoners who cited Quranic verses were granted privileges.
The army chiefs were alarmed by the gradual Islamization and announced this trend had become Turkey s most acute danger to its security. This time the army did not use force, but rather turned to the State Security Court calling to ban Erbakan and his party from any political activity. Behind the scenes, the army also worked on establishing an alternative coalition. Meanwhile, millions of people demonstrated in the streets, calling for Erbakan s resignation. Erbakan s government finally fell in July 1997 after one year in power. The army got its way and proved it could mobilize the Turkish public when needed.
Then years later, as the 2007 parliamentary elections campaign neared its peak, the army again expressed its discontent at the Islamist party s popularity and what it perceived as the party s attempt to threaten secularism. Similar to the events of 1997, millions of Turks took to the streets in a series of demonstrations against the Islamic party.
But the end result was completely different this time, with the AKP s landslide victory in July.
So what changed?
Turkish observers maintain that most people in the streets do not really see an Islamic threat emanating from the AKP. In fact, most people believed the party would not promote a radical Islamist move.
Islamism does not have 47 percent support in Turkey, explains Cengiz Candar, one of Turkey s most renowned journalists.
According to Candar, if the AKP represented a return to Islamism, it would not have gained so much support
Head of the Department of Political Science at Cankaya University in Ankara, Prof. Ramazan Gozen, agrees with Candar.
“When looking at the performance of the single-party government – the AKP government – in the last five years, you will see that AKP has pushed forward Turkey s European Union bid, Gozen says.
Are we saying this government is playing a double role – trying to make Turkey a part of the EU and at the same time imposing the Sharia on Turkey? No, I do not think this is the case, says Gozen.
This government and most of the people in the street want to have a developed, modern Turkey, which is part of the Western world and a part of the EU, Gozen explains.
Turkish analysts also cite the considerable economic gains the AKP government achieved since 2002, as well as the fact that none of Erbakan s Islamization steps from 1996-97 were apparent during the last term of the AKP government.
But that was not all that had changed. Unlike the army s success in 1997, this time around it was unable to mobilize the Turkish population against the government.
The Turkish people demonstrated its commitment to democracy, which simultaneously meant that the Turkish people were unhappy and uneasy with the intervention of forces – meaning the army – outside or beyond the legitimate political space, Candar says.
The army has always ranked as the most popular and respected institution in Turkey. There is no indication that this has changed. However, during the events of the last few months, the Turkish people may have signaled to the army that its dual role as defender of the nation from both external and internal threats has become obsolete.
There can be no greater protector of democracy than the people itself. If you have a democratic political culture, and the people are engaged in the political process, then you do not need anybody to protect democracy other than the people itself, Candar says.
According to Gozen, the people of the Turkish nation all respect the army as the guardian of Turkish security.
But if you ask the people whether the army should intervene in politics, they will say no, Gozen says.
What next?
Most Turkish observers agree that direct military intervention, or a coup, are things of the past. The army, they believe, will not force the government to resign without gaining the support of the people first. Nevertheless, the AKP is well aware of the army s enormous popularity. It is also aware of the public s sensitivity to steps that would suggest a return to Islamization in fields such as politics, education and the economy.
As a result most observers suggest tha
t the AKP would probably try to maintain its moderate positions, avoiding civil and military discontent.
The army, for its part, has so far refrained from tangible actions against the government – except for one small, symbolic move. A brief report in one of the Turkish media outlets on August 5 indicates that 10 military officers were fired for their Islamist leanings. Though not without precedent, the context in which this move was committed was too obvious to be ignored.
This article is published by Daily News Egypt in collaboration with The Media Line Ltd. (www.themedialine.org)
