If Syrians ever had any doubt about Hezbollah s military prowess, they were pleasantly surprised by its remarkable performance during its confrontation with Israel last summer. By holding out for more than a month against Israel, the most powerful military in the Middle East, Hezbollah showed itself to be a powerhouse. Over and above the tremendous psychological boost this gave the embattled Syrian regime (worn down by continuous US pressures), Hezbollah held its own for 34 days despite the punishing blows of Israel s massive air strikes and Hezbollah fighters were able to launch an average of 150 Katyusha rockets per day into northern Israel, defeating the Israel Air Force in the process and forcing one fourth of Israel s civilian population from their homes into shelters.
Most Syrians scoff at suggestions that Hezbollah s victory is debatable. Despite Israel s overwhelming American-backed power, the Jewish state, even when egged on by Washington, failed to achieve its stated objectives of releasing its two captured servicemen and eliminating Hezbollah s arsenal. The mere fact that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was obliged to convene a commission of inquiry into what went wrong provides Syrians the evidence they need to distinguish victor from vanquished.
To be sure, the cost of Israel s retribution following Hezbollah s July 12 cross-border attack was high for Lebanon. The conflict killed more than one thousand civilians, severely damaged Lebanon s infrastructure and displaced close to a million Lebanese, one quarter of whom fled to Syria. High too was the cost to Syria, at least at the strategic level. In the aftermath of the conflict, Hezbollah forces dug in behind the Litani River rather than at the international border where they were massed prior to the confrontation. As a result, Hezbollah s freedom of maneuver is now more restricted, reducing Syria s capacity to exert indirect pressure on Israel.
That said, Hezbollah s ability to disrupt US-Israeli efforts to dislodge the Shia group from the south of Lebanon and to eradicate Syrian influence in Lebanon emboldened the Syrian regime: Damascus perceived Hezbollah s victory against Israel as a victory for the Syrian-Iranian alliance and a defeat of the US-Israel-moderate Arab axis. Moreover, the post-conflict security regime that ensued did not significantly alter Hezbollah s strategic posture. Although it was forced to surrender its monopoly of force in the south of Lebanon in favor of the US-equipped Lebanese army and an expanded UNIFIL, neither the Lebanese army nor UNIFIL had the will or the mandate, respectively, to disarm Hezbollah. Finally, despite Hezbollah s loss of the border strip, its rockets can still reach deep into Israel, providing Syria and its Iranian ally with continued leverage.
In hindsight, the one regret Damascus has is not having exploited the opportunity for a Syrian land grab in the Golan. Indeed, as Hezbollah fighters skillfully tied the Israeli army down, Syrian land forces were in an ideal position to storm Israel s Golan defenses. A successful Syrian thrust into the Golan would have boosted Syria s chances of resuming peace talks with Israel later, this time on Syria s own terms.
Thus, one lesson Syria learned from the July War is that caution does not always pay. Another has to do with doctrine: Hezbollah s success demonstrated that guerrilla warfare, at least in this instance, yielded better results than conventional power. During the fighting, Hezbollah fighters trained in anti-tank warfare shuttled from village to village on scooters to launch attacks. Many took cover in underground tunnels. In addition to Hezbollah s discipline and motivation, these tactics were instrumental in robbing Israel of victory.
Within this context, the ramifications for the region in general and for Syrian-Israeli relations in particular are rather ominous. The absence of a peaceful resolution to the Syrian-Israeli conflict combined with the broader tensions in the US-Iranian relationship might tempt Damascus to apply the lessons it learned from the July War .
Murhaf Jouejatiis professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University in Washington, DC. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org
