Pakistan’s embattled president, Pervez Musharraf, once declared, “I am not at all a politician. I don’t think I’m cut out for politics. Eight years after seizing power and exiling his main civilian opponents, the general is moving heaven and earth to hold on to political office.
Though he took power in a bloodless coup, there was little doubt about his popularity at the time. The public had tired of a civilian regime marked by corruption and economic chaos. Musharraf’s personal frankness and integrity appealed to the street and earned him de facto legitimacy.
The general, who offered the father of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, as his model, also seemed to represent a vision that combined economic growth with support for secularizing impulses. But, given his unwillingness to seek support for his regime and his policies from the ballot box, Musharraf succeeded in undermining both. Over the years, he rigged referendums, browbeat the judiciary, and asked Islamic parties for support to shore up his government. A president’s modernizing vision degenerated into a dictator’s power-driven myopia.
In March, he sacked the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Mukammad Chaudhry, probably because Chaudhry objected to Musharraf’s seeking a constitutionally questionable third term as president. It proved to be the tipping point, triggering waves of protests in Pakistan’s main cities. Unable to vote the general out of office, the public took to the streets. Polls show Musharraf’s support has fallen to a third of the population, and that two-thirds oppose his seeking another presidential term.
Simultaneously, there has been considerable erosion of support from Musharraf’s strongest external backer, the United States. After he seized power, America welcomed Musharraf’s willingness to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban on his territory in exchange for large infusions of military aid. But, given the long-standing relationship between Pakistan’s Islamic militants and the military, the limits to how far Musharraf was prepared to go in the “war on terrorism became clear.
Musharraf is now desperate to beg, steal, or borrow any political legitimacy he can get – including from the two civilian political leaders he exiled. His most ambitious strategy has been to try to form a partnership with Benazir Bhutto, the head of one of the two largest democratic parties. Bhutto initially saw this as an opportunity to end her exile and ease herself into the prime ministership with a politically wounded partner.
The other civilian leader, Nawaz Sharif, responded by defying his exile, returning to Pakistan, and promptly being re-expelled. But Sharif succeeded in undermining the Bhutto-Musharraf plan, positioning himself as Pakistan’s genuine champion of democracy. In one move, he reversed the Pakistani political dynamic: being farthest from the dictator became more valuable than being closest to him. Unsurprisingly, Bhutto is now having second thoughts about an alliance with Musharraf, who has been reduced to chasing after her in an effort to salvage the deal.
Musharraf, according to his lawyer’s depositions before the Supreme Court, plans to give up his uniform after the indirect presidential elections he scheduled for October 6. In preparation, he has replaced senior generals in the Pakistani army with officers considered more beholden to him, evidently hoping that this will ensure the military’s loyalty even after he removes himself from the chain of command.
However, his options are shrinking rapidly. The US, concerned with ensuring stability in case of a transition to a new government, is keeping silent about its preference for Musharraf to remain head of both the government and the army. The Bush administration is slowly recognizing that for a Pakistani leader to be an effective counterterrorism ally, he or she must have a modicum of legitimacy. Even Osama bin Laden, sensing an opportunity to stir up trouble and win popular support, has issued a video calling for a jihad against Musharraf.
Nor can Musharraf count on the military, despite his recent appointments. The generals have always placed the institution of the military above all else, including rulers from their own ranks. If they come to believe that Musharraf is sinking, they can be counted on to cut him loose, especially if he becomes a civilian.
Pramit Pal Chaudhuriis a fellow at the Asia Society, New York. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate/The Asia Society. (www.project-syndicate.org / www.asiasociety.org)
