A year from now, Iran will continue to be highly newsworthy and will remain for many an enigmatic riddle . The billion dollar question, however, is clear: it concerns the stability and sustainability of the Islamic regime.
Four more specific questions in particular can be identified in relation to the future of Iran in a year. Will Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remain in power as the leader of the revolution? Will there be a takeover by the Revolutionary Guards? Will the frustration of Iranian civil society turn into disenchantment with the reformists and become more radicalized and violent? Finally, will the country suffocate from total economic turmoil and total bankruptcy of the Iranian banks?
The staying power of the supreme leader – both that of the individual currently holding the position, Ali Khamenei, and that of the office – will be a key driver of the immediate future of Iran. It goes without saying that a total loss of legitimacy and a disputed succession of the leader in the event of his death could bring on a power struggle among different factions of the Iranian regime, leading to a military coup d etat organized by the joint forces of the Pasdaran and the Basij.
The aspirations of Iranian civil society a year from now could range from low to high. At the low end of the spectrum, one could expect to find a high wave of emigration among educated youth, whereas at the higher end one could find a more radical stance and greater support for violence.
As for the Iranian economy, it will certainly be on its death bed after a prolonged spell of low oil revenues, low foreign investment, high inflation and unemployment, and corruption. This could be aggravated by political, cultural and economic sanctions from the West. And there could be a visible increase in unrest among ethnic minorities in Iran.
On the basis of these critical indicators, one can expect in a year a harsher crackdown and tougher response to opposition groups by paramilitary and security forces. For one, high ranking clerics in Iran will become even more critical toward a regime that has lost its grip over Iranian reality once and for all and embarks on shooting its opponents to survive. The fate of Iranian politics will be partly decided by grand ayatollahs in the holy Shia city of Qom who never supported the religious and political ideas of Ali Khamenei and the hardliners within his inner circle.
Ultimately, in other words, this is a fundamental dispute over the ownership of the revolution and the means to safeguard Iranian Shia Islam. Clearly speaking, the clerical establishment in Qom will continue to be aligned with those who plan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Iran and will therefore find itself in open confrontation with the Revolutionary Guards. When this confrontation unfolds violently, there will no doubt be both casualties and beneficiaries.
The likely beneficiaries of this struggle will be the Pasdaran. With leading reformers and opponents in jail and the street tamed by a military coup d etat, the voices for radical change will fall totally silent. This in turn would lead to a renewal of plans to launch military action against Iran that would certainly inflame the entire region and have catastrophic humanitarian consequences, while enriching and empowering the dangerous and violent components of the security and military apparatus in Iran.
Because all signals point toward a gradual transformation of Iran within a year into a heavily militarized status quo power, this more ideological style will surely affect both civic reforms in Iran and its integration within the international community. The immediate and significant foreign policy implication of a Pasdaran takeover would witness the IRGC playing the nuclear card in order to again assert Iran s anti-imperialistic mission abroad and boost nationalistic pride at home.
This in turn would draw an equally aggressive answer from the regional powers, who would seek to increase their involvement and foment tensions within Iran by supporting Sunni minority groups. But these issues will also put tremendous pressure on the Iranian military and paramilitary forces, who will continue to crush internal dissent while projecting a more aggressive tone of defiance and intimidation toward world powers regarding the country s political ambitions.
Ramin Jahanbegloo is an Iranian political philosopher. He is presently a professor of political science at the University of Toronto. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org.
