Five Arab countries — Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon — are among the 37 failed states that Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace singled out recently in their Failed States Index 2010. These five are unable to control their territories, rendering them havens for crime, drugs, piracy and terrorism. Their territorial integrity is jeopardized, they are unable to make decisions that influence the lives of their citizens and they fail to provide essential services for them. Worse, they tend toward violence, corruption and tyranny.
Even more worrisome, however, no fewer than 11 Arab countries are classified as being on the verge of failure. At this rate, most Arab countries will soon be listed as failed states. Indeed, most of them suffer from poor state performance, deterioration of government legitimacy and the emergence and growth of "pre-state" structures, relations and institutions: ethnic, patriarchal, religious, sectarian, regional or tribal entities. The perception of Arab countries as failed states will accelerate if international centers of influence lose interest in the region, since the current viability of some Arab countries is due to the support they receive, whatever the reasons, from the United States and the European Union.
Only four Arab countries, all in the Gulf, are classified as moderately competent. The overall list, incidentally, omits two Arab countries — Palestine, because it is not yet a state, and the Comoros, perhaps due to its marginal importance. If these two were included in the study, the number of completely or nearly failed Arab states would increase.
In examining the reasons for the failure of contemporary Arab countries in the aftermath of colonization and national independence, one cannot accept the interpretations provided by the governing elites, families and dynasties. Sometimes, indeed, these elites blame "international colonization". Or they blame "Arab particularity", wherein Arab historic, religious, cultural and social heritage are said to contradict modernity and not harmonize with the discipline of freedom, human rights, democracy and pluralism. That "discipline", it is argued, is the byproduct of western culture and is not a natural outcome of Arab Islamic civilization.
It goes without saying that all of these "interpretations" are but pretexts and arguments that are most often used to justify the inertia and passiveness that characterize political reform, democratization and integrated socio-economic development processes in Arab countries and communities. Nor is this passiveness limited any longer to Arab monarchies. Rather, to a large extent, it has become the status of republican systems that, with the passage of time, are becoming "monarchic republics".
Most Arab intellectuals and reformists argue that the main reason for Arab state failure is governing patterns that spread in the post-independence era and that are known for their totalitarian and dominant nature and their dependence on extensive military and security forces to grasp and maintain power. These forms of governance have marginalized political parties and civil society organizations, impeded the judiciary and denied it independence, controlled the press and media, eliminated the principle of the separation of powers and concentrated all constitutional authority in the hands of a single person, family or group of individuals who are beyond accountability.
In order to perpetuate their dominance and build up a social base for their government, most of these systems have been implementing the policy of divide and rule. They have impeded both the rule of law and the principle of citizenry as a basis for rights and duties and a regulator of relations between the individual and the state. They have relied on tribes and sects; they are a minority ruling the majority. They have excluded entire social groups or marginalized their political and economic presence. They have based the security, military and civil institutions of the state on the principle of political loyalty —of family, sect and tribe. They have deprived large groups of their citizens of their basic rights.
As the Arab state has lost many of its monopoly power factors, minor and secondary identities have grown, sectarian and tribal structures and linkages have been revived and the role of non-state actors has been exacerbated. The liberalization of trade and the economy has weakened the role of the proprietary state, ended its status as largest employer and enhanced the private sector. The communication, media and internet revolution has, in parallel, deprived the state of monopoly control over the media and sources of news. In some Arab countries, the proliferation of light weapons has resulted in the state losing its monopoly over the use of force.
If Somalia is an example of the worst sort of state failure in terms of internal collapse and projection of threats to regional and international security and stability, Sudan is likely to have a similar destiny if peace and self-determination do not arrive to Darfur and the South in fulfillment of the requirements of conciliation and coexistence. Yemen, which used to be part of "Arabia Felix", is sliding toward Somalia’s status in projecting threats of terrorism, piracy, weapons and drug trafficking and civil war.
The roots of failure and sources of threat in these countries can extend and spread. Schism in Yemen will not stop at the country’s northern and southern borders. The Houthi belligerence is echoing in the eastern region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a country where nearly a century of family rule has failed to handle the challenges of equal citizenry and regional unity. Moreover, the Houthi movement in the Saada Mountains is largely welcomed in Bahrain, a country of "moderate competence" that faces a major challenge resulting from the imbalanced relationship between a ruling Sunni minority and a Shi’ite majority complaining about discrimination. Indeed, repercussions of events taking place in the Saada mountains are reaching southern Iraq, Kuwait and Jabal Amel in southern Lebanon.
The international actors now looking at failed Arab states and concerned over the challenge to international security, peace and stability are currently developing strategies to prevent the collapse of these countries. In some cases, this means direct interference in their internal affairs, including even security and military activities on their territory —with or without coordination with their governments. The most important issue here is that the citizens of these countries are the major victims of this failure.
Oraib Rantawi, a writer and political analyst, is director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons.org
