BRUSSELS/CAIRO: Surprised with the so called “Arab Spring,” Europe has been scrambling to justify relations with former dictators while it revises policies to better suit the democratization aspirations of North Africa.
Long before mass protests swept Tunisia last December and shortly after in Egypt, activists and opposition members had considered the West — the United States and Europe — a hindrance when it came to aspirations for political change. Democracy programs and even intermittent pressure on the former regimes to implement reforms were often seen as strategic moves rather than genuine efforts.
That the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt remained in power this long and their presidents often received with open arms by American and European leaders were proof for many politicians in North Africa that the West wasn’t the slightest bit interested in real reform, regardless of how many times Western diplomats stressed otherwise.
“In the past too many have traded democracy for stability,” José Manuel Durão Barroso, president of the European Commission, said candidly in his address to Cairo in July. “But recent events have only proven that lasting stability can only be achieved through democratic and accountable governments.”
Others were blunter in their assessment of regional relations pre-2011.
“We have to be honest and accept that we accepted Mubarak’s argument that it’s better him than the deluge represented by the Brotherhood, the Islamists. And at the same time, there was a kind of racist belief that perhaps these Middle Eastern societies weren’t ready for the kind of democratic change that we’ve now seen,” explained Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
But the senior policy fellow of this pan-European think-tank and other observers is unable to pin down how the EU could’ve done things differently, except maybe by being more vocal about violations by the Mubarak regime.
Even if there was a clearer path of action, relations remained governed by the dubious rules of diplomacy. “The only thing worse than a hypocritical foreign policy, which is the one we pursued, is an entirely unhypocritical foreign policy,” Korski said. The latter, he argued, would entail war over every ideological difference.
When it came to the Middle East, he added, the US determined the policy and the EU tagged along.
“In diplomacy, the tension between moral and strategic considerations is always acute and often shaming — rarely more so than in the American relationship with Egypt,” David Remnick wrote in the New Yorker last February.
Regardless of the West’s regional policies — or perhaps in spite of it — regime change swept North Africa. As Mark Leonard, director of ECFR noted, it was important that it was internal, not imposed.
Nonetheless, ramifications on foreign policies are unavoidable.
The “Arab Spring” has changed Europe, not just the Middle East, and it’s also changing the way Europe is treating its neighbors, according to Stefan Fule, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy.
“It was also a wakeup call for us, for us to reflect on whether we have been successful with our neighborhood policies so far; whether we have been able, in the past, to deliver on the expectations of the citizens in the south; whether we have not used the policy which considers values and interest as two separate entities instead of one integrated approach to our neighbors,” the commissioner said.
Although many European diplomats are sometimes on the defensive when quizzed by members of the European parliament, European rights activists, or journalists — especially from Egypt and Tunisia — an apology is not their biggest challenge. Proving in words and later on in actions that their regional policies have radically changed seems to be the toughest at the moment.
Last month, a group of Egyptian and Tunisian journalists were invited to Brussels for exactly this purpose: understanding the changes. That too proved to be a challenge. There are pledges for more funds for the southern Mediterranean states, with promises that Tunisia and Egypt would get the biggest shares. Yet, both the policies and the tools weren’t much different from those employed prior to 2011.
Explaining the changes, EU high representative spokesperson Michael Mann noted the support to civil society in Egypt and Tunisia. This had featured prominently in programs introduced through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) before. Asked about the difference, Mann said, “Now we have an opportunity to do it properly.”
The same concept surfaced in other officials’ responses when asked about the degree of change, with words like “beefing up” featuring in answers almost as frequently as the references to the additional funds to be pumped.
“If we take their statements at face value, the change is fundamental, comprehensive and long lasting. They will no longer be propping up dictators but would be supporting democracies … But if we dig a little deeper, six months after the initial upheavals, it becomes increasingly apparent that some things have changed but other things have not,” Korski said, in reference to announced changes in the ENP.
The three M’s
In his address to Cairo last month, Barroso hailed the EU as the first to respond “with details of concrete support” to Egypt’s transition. The ENP, he said, is “a policy predicated on the idea that human rights and democracy are the best basis for inclusive growth and shared prosperity.”
In March, the EU’s first response to the “Arab Spring” said it was premature to announce support packages until its government defined priorities. By May, the Union issued a more comprehensive review detailing the changes in its neighborhood policies, encompassing the eastern and southern neighbors. In May, the EU said it will pump in extra €1.2 billion on top of the €5.7 billion making the ENP budget for the next two years.
The changes in EU polices regarding the region coincide with the further implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009. The treaty that also addresses decision making within the union would make its relations with its neighbors less bureaucratic, as Fule explained. They also coincide with Poland assuming the rotating presidency of the Union. The relatively new member wants to make a radical impact during its presidency, although it’s not clear what this mean for the ENP.
The recent review is about “shifting the relationship from the exclusive cooperation with authorities to a larger and larger cooperation in support of the civil societies,” according to Fule. Government officials were invited along with think-tanks and other community leaders to contribute in the review, he said.
“The neighborhood policy isn’t something we put on the table and … [say] take it or leave it. It’s been a product of our joint endeavor. And its implementation will be also with an appropriate level of the ownership of our partners,” he said, noting a joint commitment to universal values.
In addition to a list of 20 “seriously beefed up instruments of cooperation,” money, mobility and market access will be defining parts of the changes in policy.
In addition to the €7 billion, the EU committed itself to €6 billion in loans in the next three years. Nine Egyptian projects are already in the pipeline for the next 12 months worth over €1 billion, Barroso said.
More democracy-tailored programs include "SPRING" (Support for Partnership, Reform, and Inclusive Growth) to be launched in September with €350 million in grants; the yet-to-be finalized European Endowment for Democracy, dedicated to helping people find their authentic democratic voices; and 40 percent increase in funds to the Erasmus and Marie Curie education programs.
The EU also wants to initiate partnerships with select governments in the Southern Mediterranean, including Egypt, to facilitate the movement of its students, businessmen and artists to and within Europe.
“We recognize that transitions to democracy also depend on new jobs and economic growth,” Barrosso said, noting that Egypt is Europe’s biggest trading partner in the region.
Liberalization of trade is on the short to medium term agenda. A Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) tying Egypt to the EU’s half-billion investors, businesses and consumers is a long term goal, with a full free trade zone between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean also on mind.
“It’s not a fundamentally transformative offer. We were not giving you carrot juice and tomorrow we are giving you champagne,” Korski said of the overall changes.
“In the EU closet, that’s what we have on the shelves. That said, I think we are much more enthusiastic about backing civil society, democracy promotion and human rights. I think we are willing to spend a lot a more money to do what we can to help you gain access to those markets that you are not there. We are willing to do a lot more.”
In Part 2, online tomorrow, Egypt tries to define how it can benefit from the review as ambiguous strategies and goals define the approach of both sides, especially during the transition.
