Political decision-making is a complex and perilous phase in any nation’s political journey. A state is more than a mere combination of land, populace, and governance. It embodies a concept that intersects with various other notions, such as its capacity to fulfill its duties domestically, regionally, and globally.
The decision-making process is the pinnacle of a state’s political activities, hinging on two pivotal elements: “political geography” and “geopolitics.” While some may view these as a single discipline, they are distinct. Political geography delves into the factors shaping a state’s domestic policies, whereas geopolitics examines the elements influencing its foreign affairs.
American political scientists John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato explore these ideas in their book “How States Think,” a seminal work on the modern understanding of statehood. The book serves as a vital guide for those seeking to predict and comprehend the decisions made by presidents and leaders at critical junctures.
The authors provide a lucid definition of a state, describing it as “a legal entity, multifaceted in its quest for survival. It can err, choose wisely, fail, or succeed. Ultimately, it may even self-destruct.”
Mearsheimer and Rosato use Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a case study. To many, Russia’s actions, led by President Vladimir Putin, appeared irrational due to Ukraine’s size, Russia’s lack of skilled troops and superior weaponry, and minimal international support for Moscow’s control over Kyiv. The United States had disclosed Putin’s plans and global economic powers threatened sanctions, while NATO pledged military aid to Ukraine.
Yet, Mearsheimer and Rosato argue that viewing Ukraine as an extension of Russia is justifiable. Historically, Ukraine has been a strategic shield for Moscow against Europe. They suggest that Putin’s strategy was influenced by the balance of power theory, with Ukraine acting as a barrier against NATO expansion.
For the Kremlin, keeping Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence is imperative. The authors stress that if Russia’s campaign fails or if Putin’s regime collapses, it won’t be due to the invasion’s irrationality but rather the Russian military’s shortcomings and NATO’s support for Ukraine.
Recent studies by political scientists on leadership psychology reveal its significant impact on decision-making. Leaders’ biases, beliefs, personalities, and perceptions shape their worldviews, while their emotions influence their problem-solving approaches, particularly in crises.
For example, Putin’s determination to annex Ukraine is frequently mentioned as the motive behind his military intervention. Nonetheless, Mearsheimer and Rosato contend that most international decisions are made rationally, with leaders weighing the expected advantages of possible outcomes. A decision is deemed rational if it rests on “realistic assumptions,” “solid causal reasoning,” and “empirical support.” In essence, leaders are convinced that their theories, notions, and decisions are coherent, logical, and well-founded, even though they are seldom subjected to objective scrutiny. Retrospective analysis may validate or refute these decisions.
The book “How States Think” offers an exhaustive examination of the collective decisions made by state officials from World War I to the present day. The authors, Mearsheimer and Rosato, reassess historical decisions that were once perceived as illogical, demonstrating their rationality. They reference the ill-fated German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and Japan’s assault on Pearl Harbor that same year as examples of rational decisions.
World War II stands as a pivotal moment in history, its impact echoing through the ages, shaped by the decisions of its leaders. A notable instance is French General Petain’s choice to surrender Paris to German forces without significant resistance. Initially met with public indignation and calls for a treason trial, it took over three decades post-World War II for the French to acknowledge that Petain’s decision spared Paris—and Rome—from the widespread destruction endured by other European capitals. This realization led to a renewed appreciation for Petain, credited with preserving Paris’s cultural and archaeological marvels.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s conciliatory stance towards Adolf Hitler is another noteworthy case. Mearsheimer and Rosato argue that Chamberlain’s consent for Hitler to annex substantial portions of Czechoslovakia in 1938, rather than confronting the German military, was a rational choice influenced by the logic of power balance.
The book cites numerous instances that illuminate the dynamics and consequences of decision-making. Ultimately, what endures is the essence of “political decision-making,” which, as highlighted, represents the apex of a crisis. Decisions are typically made amidst a deluge of conflicting information gathered by state apparatuses. At such a juncture, the concept of political decision-making becomes a “balance between the improbable and the impossible.” Decision-makers opt for the “improbable” to avoid the repercussions of the “impossible,” casting light on the challenges and potential infeasibility of some critical decisions, and how governments navigate crises.
Dr Hatem Sadek: Professor at Helwan University
