Syria is currently witnessing rising tensions between Türkiye and Israel, manifested in semi-military clashes and indirect skirmishes driven by conflicting regional interests. This conflict has intensified following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, creating a power vacuum that both countries have sought to exploit to expand their influence.
Current evidence suggests that Syria could become a battleground for Israel and Türkiye, with reports indicating that relations between the two nations are moving toward potential escalation. Their conflicting interests may fuel an indirect conflict through proxies. The semi-military confrontation between Türkiye and Israel reflects a persistent state of tension and rivalry rooted in divergent goals in this troubled country. However, it remains unlikely that this tension will escalate into direct military conflict in the near future, given the overlapping regional interests shared by Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Nonetheless, several factors suggest a strong likelihood that Syria will evolve into a proxy battlefield between Israel and Türkiye. First, their conflicting objectives: Israel seeks to curb the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria, viewing them as direct threats to its national security. Israel also aims to preserve its military superiority in the region, eliminate weapon depots from the former Syrian army that could fall into hostile hands, and establish a secure zone in southern Syria to protect its borders. In contrast, Türkiye is focused on expanding its influence in northern Syria, targeting Kurdish groups it deems a threat, resettling Syrian refugees, and reinforcing its regional standing while safeguarding strategic interests. These clashing priorities have created fertile ground for competition and a struggle for dominance. Türkiye’s recent signs of rapprochement with the current Syrian regime have raised concerns in Tel Aviv.
Second, Syria’s internal condition continues to deteriorate. Years of civil war have led to fragmentation and the weakening of state institutions, making the country susceptible to external interventions. Armed factions that refuse to disarm still operate across the country, and near-daily skirmishes continue between remnants of the regime and the de facto authority under Ahmed al-Shara. These ongoing confrontations hinder any comprehensive political or security resolution.
Third, the role of international powers complicates the landscape further. Russia, a longstanding supporter of the former regime, has a tense relationship with Türkiye, which could further destabilize the situation. Israel, meanwhile, may leverage its coordination with Russia to counter Iran’s influence in Syria. The United States, as a strategic ally to both Türkiye through NATO and Israel in the Middle East, remains a key player capable of influencing the dynamics of this conflict. In summary, the interplay of Turkish-Israeli tensions, Syria’s fragile state, and the involvement of international actors all point toward Syria becoming a prolonged arena for indirect conflict.
Indirect tensions between Türkiye and Israel are expected to persist in the short term due to their significant strategic interests in Syria. The potential for direct confrontation exists—especially if an unexpected event occurs, such as an Israeli strike mistakenly targeting Turkish forces. However, both sides appear to favor restraint, mindful of the high costs of escalation, particularly as they remain key partners of the United States—Türkiye in NATO and Israel in the region. Despite the semi-military competition between them, their mutual interest in avoiding a full-blown conflict could serve as a stabilizing factor for now.
Ankara is reportedly attempting to establish a stronger foothold in central Syria, particularly in Damascus. However, Tel Aviv has consistently responded to such efforts with overwhelming force, though without triggering a major response—suggesting the existence of informal coordination mechanisms aimed at managing the conflict, akin to Israel’s approach with Russia in Syria.
The only confirmed outcome at this stage is that Syria has transformed from a regional power into a vulnerable space subject to external manipulation. Its future is now shaped by the interests of regional and international powers. Syria may soon resemble Lebanon’s model, where internal stability and security depend on a political arrangement negotiated among key players such as Türkiye, Israel, France, Russia, and the United States. Whether Syria moves toward peace or deeper fragmentation will largely depend on the outcome of this regional consensus. The possibility of Syria being divided into administrative “cantons”—Kurdish, Druze, and others—remains a likely scenario, one favored by Israel to enhance its national security.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
