In Washington we have yet another acronym: AfPak, which stands for Afghanistan and Pakistan. More specifically, the contraction relates to the area of responsibilities of Ambassador Richard Holbrook, the special adviser to President Barack Obama for the two aforementioned countries.
Beyond the swelling of the field of acronym-ology, the term AfPak sends a clear message that the United States regards success of current counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations as well as longer-term state-building projects in Afghanistan as directly linked with Pakistan. This is not to say that suddenly there has been a realization that success in Afghanistan is dependent upon the role Islamabad plays vis-a-vis its neighbor to the north and on its ability to manage the internal insurgencies and political challenges within its borders–particularly in the North-West Frontier Province, parts of Baluchistan Province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan frontier. Back in September 2008, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen made the clear connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan when he told the US House of Representatives that he did not speak of Afghanistan without also speaking of Pakistan . Mullen added that in his view, these two nations are
inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them. The term AfPak signifies that this linkage is now the cornerstone of US policies for the region.
The current military campaign in Afghanistan began as a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, while originally strictly a counterterrorism operation to root out those responsible for the attacks, has evolved into a broader strategy to prevent the resurgence of terrorist activities through state-building. These efforts have been very successful, leading to the establishment of institutions of democracy in Afghanistan and also cultivating a sense of renewal among the Afghans that their country is regaining its place among normal states in the region.
However, these advances are now being challenged as Afghanistan becomes embroiled in an increasingly intricate insurgency. The insurgents, known by some as the neo-Taliban, are comprised of former Taliban leaders, various warlords, disenchanted segments of Afghan society – mostly among the Pashtuns – Afghan and international drug barons, and foreign terrorists, namely al-Qaeda. This unsavory cast of characters is fed by the culture of corruption within the Afghan government, emboldened by the presence of foreign forces and supported by like-minded elements from Afghanistan s neighbors, especially Pakistan.
The general tendency in Kabul is to blame the shortcomings of the Afghan democratic experiment and the increasing strength of the insurgency on lack of cooperation by Pakistan in stemming the inflow of militants into Afghanistan and on Islamabad s alleged direct support of the neo-Taliban. For its part Pakistan, itself struggling with a growing insurgency inside its borders, has responded to these accusations by playing up its losses and its suffering as a frontline state engaged in counterterrorist activities.
The new US strategy, which recognizes Afghanistan and Pakistan as a seamless region from which the terrorists and their neo-Taliban allies operate, is to reorient the US campaign back to a counterterrorism operation with the primary objective once again being to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in the AfPak region. The United States remains committed in this new strategy to empowering Afghan military and police forces through training and partnership to improve human security for Afghans and to establish space for democratic institutions to flourish.
Initial reactions to the new US strategy from both Kabul and Islamabad have been positive. Initial reporting from Pakistan indicates that Islamabad is satisfied with the strategy. Afghanistan too has applauded it because of the US commitment to increase the number of troops, but more importantly because of what Kabul believes to be an official acknowledgement that the bases of the terrorists who are undermining Afghanistan s security are in Pakistan. However, Afghanistan s initial enthusiasm may abate once Pakistan becomes more involved in AfPak programs and its resources and international strategic relevance begin to overshadow Kabul s current standing in geo-political significance.
And let us not forget India. While the Afghan conflict is increasingly a regional and trans-regional issue, the most immediate wildcard in the current AfPak strategy seems to be India. Delhi has to decide whether to play the role of spoiler or peacemaker. For AfPak to become a zone of stability and security, Kabul and Islamabad need to regard each other as neighbors with mutually linked interests and futures rather than zones of strategic depth or ethnic expansionist dreams.
Yet Pakistan continues to view India s policies as an existential threat and Afghanistan as its defense in depth. In Kabul s strategic and historic thinking, India has served as a bulwark against Pakistan s illegitimate control of parts of the Pashtun homeland. Against this backdrop, the path India chooses will significantly influence the outcome of the AfPak strategy. Al-Qaeda and its allies could be defeated militarily and ideologically if Afghanistan, Pakistan and India adopt a model similar to Europe s economic interdependency and political cooperation.
Dr. Amin Tarziis director of Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Marine Corps University or any other US governmental agency. References to this paper should include the foregoing statement. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org
